ABOUT CONCORD

CONCORD is the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development.

Our members are:

28 National Platforms
25 Networks
04 Associate Members

which represent over 2,600 NGOs supported by millions of citizens all around Europe. Our confederation brings development NGOs together to strengthen their political impact at the European and global levels. United, we advocate for Europe-wide policies to promote sustainable economic, environmental and social development based on human rights, justice and gender equality. We also work with regional and global civil society allies to ensure that EU policies are coherent in promoting sustainable development in partner countries.

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ABOUT THE AIDWATCH REPORT

CONCORD AidWatch has monitored and made recommendations on the quality and quantity of aid provided by EU member states and the European Commission since 2005. With the AidWatch publications, CONCORD members want to hold EU leaders accountable for their commitments to dedicate 0.7% of their Gross National Income to development assistance and to use this aid in a genuine and effective way. The AidWatch initiative carries out ongoing advocacy, research, media activities and campaigns on a wide range of aid-related issues throughout the year.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With ten years left until the deadline to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2030, the European Union (EU) and its Member States urgently need to ramp up efforts to deliver on their longstanding development assistance commitments and make good on their promise to ‘leave no one behind’. While the EU as a bloc remained the world’s largest donor in 2018, investing €71.9 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) EU aid went down for the second year in a row – representing only 0.47% of the EU’s combined GNI. This was partially due to a welcome reduction of in-donor refugee costs, student costs, debt relief, tied aid and interest repayments, which do not contribute to development in partner countries and as such inflate overall amounts. Yet, ‘inflated aid’ continued to represent 14% of EU ODA, and even discounting these components, aid is still going down. At this rate, the 0.7% ODA/GNI target will not be met until 2061.

Concerns also remain that EU donors are losing focus on development effectiveness – particularly in terms of alignment with country-led results frameworks – with a risk of undermining the impact of ODA. Interventions on key areas that are proven to contribute to reducing inequalities, such as investments in the Least Development Countries, gender-equity and support to civil society, are also largely falling behind.

With inequality, exclusion and marginalisation hampering progress on the SDGs, there is an urgent need to focus on how ODA is allocated, to better serve the people who are left behind. In the absence of a universal definition of ‘leaving no one behind’, identifying who, why and where is the first step to operationalise the principle. While the EU has enshrined the principle in the European Consensus on Development, no systematic approach or methodology to identify those left behind exists, and several Member States have not yet translated this commitment into national policy. Looking at a core group of the 16 poorest and most financially challenged countries — taking their current and future political and financial situation into account — there is dramatic evidence that those most in need of resources currently receive only 8% of EU aid. ‘Leaving no one behind’ requires a ‘people-centred’ approach to drive a thorough identification process focusing both on the people who are most marginalised, excluded or discriminated against and the poorest and most financially challenged countries. Data is critical to success and as such the EU must contribute to significantly improving the quality and coverage of disaggregated data.

Thanks to its concessional nature and clear poverty reduction objective, ODA has a comparative advantage to focus on inequality and live up to the leave no one behind pledge. This is why the EU must better align ODA allocation and programming decision-making with evidence of high levels of poverty and inequality. Measuring progress and outcomes is key to informing these decisions and holding donors to account. This requires a systematic approach based on a paradigm shift away from GDP growth and income-based measures alone and towards indicators that weigh the wellbeing of all. It is only through a multi-layered effort to curb inequalities between people, groups and places that progress for the people furthest behind will be within reach.
The AidWatch 2019 report focuses on the concept of ‘leaving no one behind’ as introduced by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and how this can guide decisions on financing for development. Part One gives an overview of development policy and financing trends at European level and analyses whether European aid is Enough, Employed correctly, Effective and Equality-focused, compared with the objectives, international standards and principles of official development assistance (ODA). Specifically, it looks into the role of ODA in leaving no one behind and the efforts by the international community to operationalise the pledge. It provides recommendations on how to identify those left behind, invest in data disaggregation and measure progress. Part Two is made up of national chapters analysing the ODA record of the European Union institutions and each of its Member States.
PART ONE
Overview
The year 2020 marks the beginning of a new institutional cycle of the European Union (EU), with only 10 years left to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The May 2019 elections resulted in a more fragmented European Parliament, with the Greens, pro-EU liberals but also anti-EU populists all gaining ground. The new Members of the European Parliament will play an important role in working with the new European Commission and the EU Member States to make rapid advances for the future well-being of all people and the planet.

Four years after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and two years after the revision of the European Consensus for Development, there is still no comprehensive and measurable strategy on how to implement the SDGs and the principle of “leave no one behind” at EU level. With the continued rise of global inequality, climate change and environmental degradation, unsustainable economic and financial systems, anti-democratic political trends and challenges to multilateralism, an overarching Sustainable Europe 2030 Strategy has never been more urgent.

EU Development Ministers referred to 2019 as a unique opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its leadership ahead of the July UN High-Level Political Forum and the September SDG Summit. While concrete action to fully integrate the SDGs into the EU’s economic governance model is left to the new class of policy-makers, various initiatives have taken stock of progress to date. In 2019, the European Commission published its reflection paper Towards a Sustainable Europe by 2030. Eurostat reported on progress towards the SDGs in the EU, and the EU and its Member States approved the Joint Synthesis Report Supporting the Sustainable Development Goals across the world. The EU approach has confirmed a shift in the development paradigm from one of human development to an inward-looking path aiming to manage migratory flows, as a consequence of the so-called ‘migration crisis’. Under pressure from EU capitals, where debates over the arrivals of asylum seekers and migrants have caused political turmoil and fuelled nationalism, Brussels has been prioritising the securitisation of the EU’s borders.

At the same time, as a consequence of the EU’s scramble to mobilise additional financial flows in an attempt to shift from ‘billions to trillions’, and to close the estimated SDGs’ financing gap of $2.5 trillion a year in developing countries alone, the EU has focused strongly on providing finance to support private sector investments. Persuading the private sector to pursue a sustainable development agenda is important, but the implementation of the European External Investment Plan and the launch of the Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs have ushered in policies and practices which increase the use of public funding to leverage private investment. Yet, research has found that expectations for blended finance to bridge the SDG financing gap are unrealistic due to actual leverage ratios being very low, especially in low-income countries. Because the attempt to mobilise more private investments is at the top of the agendas of the EU and many other donors, less attention has been paid to strengthening domestic and international public resources for sustainable development.

Regrettably, not enough attention has been paid to donors’ commitments to implement the Addis Ababa Action Agenda in terms of grants mobilisation and spending 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on official development assistance (ODA). By its very nature ODA remains the only resource that can focus directly on the people left behind in a predictable manner and in complex contexts, reduce inequalities between and within countries, fill investment gaps for public services and deliver long-term development results.
The EU invests more in development cooperation than the rest of the world combined and supports a vast number of effective development efforts in partner countries. Yet many EU Member States are still far from meeting their long-standing commitments. This section of the AidWatch report takes a critical look at the EU and its Member States’ efforts in: meeting the 0.7% ODA/GNI commitment (‘Enough ODA’), contributing to economic development and welfare in developing countries (‘Employing ODA correctly’), aligning with the Busan principles of effective development cooperation (‘Effective ODA’) and focusing on reducing poverty and inequality (‘Equality-focused ODA’).

ENOUGH ODA?

Preliminary data for 2018 shows that the EU and its Member States indeed remained the biggest development donor block in the world, investing €71.9 billion in ODA, over half of global efforts. Yet in absolute terms EU aid dropped by €4.4 billion, 5.8% lower than in 2017.¹² EU Member States’ development assistance has dropped to 0.47% of the EU’s combined GNI, continuing the negative trend from 0.49% in 2017 and 0.51% in 2016.¹³

HIGHLIGHTS OF EU MEMBER STATES’ TRENDS

Overall ODA member states’ levels

- Increase of total ODA by over 10%: Hungary (73%), Malta (25%)
- Decrease of total ODA by over 10%: Italy (25%), Greece (18%), Finland (18%), Austria (16%), Lithuania (12%)

Meeting the 0.7% commitment

- No new Member States joined Sweden (1.04%), Luxembourg (0.98%), Denmark (0.71%) and the United Kingdom (UK) (0.7%), who remained the only ones meeting the 0.7% commitment in 2018
- Twelve Member States decreased their ODA/GNI ratio

BOX 1: NEW OECD ODA METHODOLOGY

A novelty in ODA reporting methods came about in 2018. ODA usually takes the form of either a grant – financial resources provided without interest or provisions to pay it back – or a concessional loan – financial resources that have to be paid back but with an interest rate significantly lower than at market price. Until now, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) used the so-called ‘cash basis’ or ‘flow basis’ method for calculating ODA spending. According to this method, grants and concessional loans were valued in the same way although they represent very different efforts from the donor country and have contrasting implications for the partner country. Repayments of concessional loans (except interests) by recipient countries were later deducted from donor countries’ spending as negative ODA.

As of 2018, the OECD DAC will instead record the ‘grant equivalent’ of ODA concessional loans. The grant equivalent is based on an estimation of the amount being given away in a loan. It is calculated by considering the loan’s full value and then subtracting the present value of its expected repayments. According to the new rules, the more concessional a loan is, the more of it will be counted as ODA. The OECD considers this method to better reflect the donor’s real financial effort and to provide a more realistic comparison between grants and loans. The new methodology has, however, raised several concerns. For example, calculating the grant equivalent is done with fixed rates instead of current market rates which risks leading to inflated grant equivalent estimates. It is crucial that these new rules do not exaggerate donor efforts,¹⁴ or create incentives for donors to revert to loans instead of grants.

Preliminary data for the EU, however, indicates that this change of method may lead to a slight overall decrease in reported ODA. This can be observed in 2018 EU ODA figures. Calculated on a flow basis, collective ODA spending would have represented 0.48% of GNI, while reporting against the grant equivalent method brings it down to 0.47%.

In this report, CONCORD analyses recorded ODA against the flow basis method, to facilitate our comparison of ODA figures with previous years. See Annex 1 for full methodology.

If the EU is truly committed to being a trailblazer for development cooperation – as proposed in the sustainable Europe reflection paper – it has the opportunity to show real ambition in the next 7-year EU budget, the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). As inter-institutional negotiations advance on the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), adequate financing is crucial to meet the EU’s international commitments, support the SDGs and focus on leaving no one behind.

¹² Due to the lack of available data for Cyprus in 2018, total calculations include figures reported in 2017. Croatian GNI is also from 2017, due to lack of updated data at the time of writing.
¹³ Calculations made using the ‘flow basis method’. See Box 1 and Annex 1 for full methodology.
¹⁴ For more information about the calculation of the grant equivalent, see: OECD, Modernisation of the DAC statistical system, www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/modernisation-dac-statistical-system.htm
**EMPLOYING ODA CORRECTLY?**

**INFLATED VERSUS GENUINE AID**

**BOX 2: INFLATED AID METHODOLOGY**

In spite of existing OECD-DAC aid reporting rules, CONCORD considers that not all financial flows currently counted as ODA contribute to development in partner countries. Scarce ODA resources must focus on leaving no one behind and as such cannot be considered genuine aid unless they contribute to achieving development outcomes at the country level. The following items should therefore be considered as components of ‘inflated aid’ and reported as other flows:

- Spending on receiving refugees in the donor country
- Additional costs caused by tying aid
- Interest repayments on concessional loans
- Debt relief and future interest on cancelled debts
- Spending on international students in the donor country

Using CONCORD’s methodology to analyse 2018 aid figures reveals that the overall decrease in ODA levels from the previous year was mainly due to cuts in ‘inflated aid’ components (see Box 1), particularly due to less aid being spent on hosting refugees as arrival numbers decreased with more restrictive EU migration policies. While it is positive that these figures are decreasing, when looking at EU Member States’ aid after discounting refugee costs, a slight drop of 0.2% is still noticeable. This trend is particularly worrying as EU ODA levels are nowhere near the resources needed to reduce poverty, to which the EU has committed to contributing. Including inflated aid components in general ODA generates a distorted picture which reinforces the need for aid reporting to follow stricter rules. Much-needed support for refugees, students and debt relief should be additional to ODA and reported separately.

Graph 1 shows that 14% of European aid was inflated in 2018, the equivalent of over €9.9 billion, down from 18.5% in 2017. Three Member States increased their inflated ODA by more than 20%: Spain (30%), Malta (almost 50%) and Romania (more than 600% - but changing from €0.05 million in 2017 to €0.39 million in 2018). On the other hand, in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Germany inflated aid decreased by over 20%, and in Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden by more than 40%.
COMPARISON OF INFLATED AID COMPONENTS

In-donor refugee costs
- In-donor refugee costs decreased by around 35%.
- Luxembourg cut its in-donor refugee costs down to zero.
- The biggest decreases were made by Austria (61%) and Greece (61%).
- The biggest increases were made by Slovenia (almost twice as much) and Romania (over six times more) even though Spain showed the highest rise in absolute terms (€38 million), followed by France (€27 million).
- Overall, expenses for refugees during the first 12 months of stay in a donor country still accounted for 9.5% of overall ODA in 2018.
- In 2018, in-donor refugee costs still accounted for at least 10% of ODA in seven countries: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands and Spain.

Tied aid
- Tied aid is expected to have decreased by around 20% from 2017 (based on a forecast method).

Student imputed costs
- Student imputed costs were reduced by 4.8% compared with 2017 (based on a forecast method).

Interest repayments
- Interest repayments went down by 6% from 2017 (based on a forecast method).

Debt relief
- European use of ODA for debt relief dropped by 66% from 2017.
- The biggest decrease from 2017 was by the Netherlands (down to zero), Spain (down by around 90%) and Italy (down by around 80%).
- Austria increased use of ODA for debt relief by 20%, Denmark by 25% and the UK by 15% compared with 2017.

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16 Tied aid, student imputed costs and interest repayments are based on forecast methods as official figures for EU and all its Member States were not available at the time of writing.
The analysis using CONCORD’s methodology reveals a wider gap to meet the 0.7% target than that which donors report. The ‘real’ EU aid gap – as shown in Table 1 – is more than €44 billion or 0.29% of GNI, whereas the gap reported is €34 billion or 0.23% of GNI.

The gap to 0.7% aid goal in 2018 - Official vs real gap

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total EU28 ODA</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid in € millions</td>
<td>% EU28 GNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total EU28 GNI</td>
<td>14,978,473</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU28 ODA commitment (0.7% of GNI)</td>
<td>104,849</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total EU28 ODA</td>
<td>70,593</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuine aid</td>
<td>60,753</td>
<td>0.40%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portion of inflated aid</td>
<td>9,870</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid gap to 0.7% (considering all reported aid)</td>
<td>34,256</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid gap to 0.7% (only considering genuine aid)</td>
<td>44,096</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This percentage corresponds to 0.405%, while inflated aid equals 0.066%.
Source: CONCORD calculations based on OECD DAC database and figures provided by national platforms, in 2017 constant prices

Graph 4: Estimated timescale for keeping the 0.7% promise: genuine vs inflated EU aid

At the current rate of increase in total reported ODA, the EU would meet the 0.7% goal in 2031, whereas last year it was projected to be met in 2023. If ‘genuine’ aid increased at the current rate, the 0.7% target will not be met until 2061, four years later than projected with 2017 figures.

Source: CONCORD calculations based on OECD DAC database and figures provided by national platforms, in 2017 constant prices
**BLENDED FINANCE**

**BOX 3: WHAT IS BLENDED FINANCE?**

Blended finance is a loosely defined concept that covers many different types of financial operations. The OECD defines it as “the strategic use of development finance for the mobilisation of additional finance towards sustainable development in developing countries.” This definition captures almost anything from a guarantee to an investment grant or technical assistance. This report only looks at the concessional side of blended finance (i.e. ODA). ODA can be blended with either public or private funds, but it is blending with private financing which has garnered increased interest among EU donors in recent years.

Under the leadership of the European Commission, the EU has been championing the case for blended finance in development cooperation. The first blending facility was created in 2007 to support infrastructure development in Africa. By 2012, there were already eight different blending facilities in place, covering all regions targeted by EU aid funds. An important update came in 2017, when the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) brought a new guarantee instrument into the EU blending toolbox. In volume, the European Commission has injected around €2.8 billion into the blending facilities between 2014 and 2018. Comparatively, EU Member States devote significantly fewer resources to blending in absolute figures (see Graph 5a). When ODA to blending is measured as a percentage of total ODA flows, the differences are smaller (see Graph 5b), with Denmark coming a close second after the EU in the last two years. These figures are based on data collected by some national platforms because the existing reporting framework does not capture blending accurately.

The new MFF will rely much more on lending. Existing proposals for 2021 to 2027 foresee a massive increase in the volume of blending operations managed by the EU institutions. For example, the volume of operations backed with guarantees is expected to increase 39-fold from €1.54 billion under the EFSD to €60 billion under the so-called EFSD+.

This increase in blended efforts, however, is not supported by strong evidence on impact and effectiveness. Independent evaluations of EU blending operations exploring the comparative advantages of different donor approaches to blending and their impact on the ground are scarce. Moreover, data collected through monitoring and evaluation systems is insufficient to demonstrate impact, while external reviews suggest that blending operations have shown mixed results at best, especially in the poorest countries. The scale-up of guarantee operations seems premature considering that as of September 2019 only one guarantee contract had been signed (of a total of 28) and that operations will take years to reach the intended beneficiaries.

**Graph 5:**

*a) ODA for blending*, selected donors in €m current

*a) ODA for blending*, selected donors in % of ODA flows

Source: OECD DAC and analysis of country questionnaire. Figures in current prices. *Data on transfers into facilities/institutions engaging in blending operations.

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19 These figures are approximate due to the limitation of the existing reporting framework.
21 At EU level, there is only a Mid-Term Evaluation of the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund released in June 2012 (www.eu-africa-infrastructure-tf.net/attachments/Publications/TIF_MTE/final-report-of-the-tif-mid-term-evaluation.pdf) and an EU Evaluation of Blending released in 2016 and covering projects until end of 2014 (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/evaluation-blending-volume1_en.pdf)
**EFFECTIVE ODA?**

The quantity of ODA remains key for financing sustainable development, but how ODA is used is equally crucial to ending global poverty. This section analyses the EU’s performance against selected indicators of the four internationally agreed Busan principles of effective development cooperation.27

**PRINCIPLE 1: FOCUS ON DEVELOPMENT RESULTS**

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) carried out the third round of monitoring of a set of indicators aligned with the development effectiveness principles in 2019. Use of the result frameworks defined by partner countries themselves is a vital part of local ownership of development priorities.

Despite some progress, the 2019 GPEDC report finds concerns that donors are losing focus on effectiveness, hence risking undermining the impact of ODA.30

In particular, it concludes that the alignment of development partners with country-led results frameworks is declining, with most EU Member States (12 of 19) having decreased the use of country-owned results frameworks and planning tools. Only five Member States and the European Commission score above average. The EU performance is a step back on its commitment to the 2030 Agenda, as this indicator directly informs SDG target 17.15 on respecting each country’s policy space and leadership.
PRINCIPLE 2: COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

One of the most important issues relating to using ODA effectively to reach development results is around the untying of aid. Tying aid to conditions of contracting products or services from the donor country is ineffective and increases the cost of that aid by around 30% of its total value. The third GPEDC monitoring round shows a welcome overall increase in the EU share of untied aid, despite some countries having tied slightly more of their aid, such as Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. In some Member States, ‘informal tying’ is clearly an issue, meaning that bidding processes are imbalanced in favour of the donor country market. The Czech Republic, Finland, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK awarded more than 70% of their total aid contract volume to their own country’s companies in 2015 and 2016.

A major challenge to local ownership of development priorities is the increased influence of EU migration and security interests on EU development cooperation. The most blatant example of EU interests taking precedence is the predominant focus on migration. Several Member States have, in the MFF negotiations, suggested making development financing to partner countries conditional on readmissions or other cooperation on EU migration policies. The suggested 10% benchmark for migration costs in the NDICI has not originated from partner countries’ priorities, but corresponds to EU Member States’ interests in curbing migration. The focus on migration management promoted by several EU Member States carries severe risks of diverting financing from priorities vital for reducing poverty, while strengthening EU relations with governments who violate human rights and repress their citizens. And it brings severe risks of funding being directed to militia or security sector actors involved in border patrol.

PRINCIPLE 3: INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS

An important indicator of well-functioning inclusive partnerships for development is that civil society organisations (CSOs) can operate in an environment that optimises their engagement in and contribution to development. According to the 2019 GPEDC report, in 57% of EU partner countries, CSOs reported that development partners sporadically address elements of an enabling environment in their policy dialogue, a view that is shared by partner countries (48%).

Looking at aid donors’ involvement of civil society, CSOs are still the stakeholder most frequently engaged to prepare country strategies (74%); however, this means that CSOs were not involved in about a quarter of cases. The majority of CSOs also reported to GPEDC that development partner funding is mainly driven by donors’ interests and priorities. A recent OECD paper reaffirmed this, finding that DAC members tend to work through CSOs as a means to reach specific donor-defined objectives, rather than support CSOs’ own strategies. This trend can also be spotted in the European Commission’s approach to civil society support. In the 2018–2020 Civil Society Programme, for example, support to CSOs in the field is limited to a set of predefined thematic priorities. Also, CSOs’ ‘right of initiative’ has been removed as a guiding principle for the programme, which emphasised that actions financed under this programme should be more ‘politically driven’.

PRINCIPLE 4: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY TO EACH OTHER

The 2019 GPEDC monitoring report found that 83% of development partners report to the partner country’s information management systems, but no separate information was available on EU donors. More development partners are making information on development cooperation publicly available, through the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS), the OECD Forward Spending Survey (FSS) and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). But particularly in the case of the FSS, the EU was outperformed by development partners as a group, even if global reporting to this system also decreased. The same declining trend was observed in overall EU performance across the other two systems and standards. However, the performance of EU Member States was mixed, and some made several improvements.

EQUALITY-FOCUSED ODA?

Ending inequality is crucial to reducing poverty, and ODA has an important role to play. Yet there is no available comprehensive measure to assess whether EU donors are providing ODA in a way which systematically reduces inequalities. For this reason, even though inequality is a complex and multifaceted issue with much wider implications, this analysis focuses on the measures currently used by the OECD DAC that are related to the fight against inequality and where enough data is available.

LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Looking at where ODA is targeted to countries with the highest need of resources – such as least developed countries (LDCs) – OECD figures show that EU Member States increased ODA from 0.11% of GNI in 2016 to 0.12% in 2017. This is still almost €5 billion short of meeting the international commitment to invest 0.15 to 0.2% of GNI in this group of countries. Around half of this amount is channelled through the European Commission and the European Investment Bank, which report they spent 25% of their ODA on LDCs.

Looking at preliminary figures from those Member States able to report 2018 figures, ten report increased amounts to LDCs: Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden. Four countries show decreases: Bulgaria, Greece, Malta and Slovakia.

GENDER EQUALITY

Abundant research shows that gender is the most persistent predictor of poverty and lack of opportunities and influence in our world today. For this reason, both the OECD and the EU track spending towards gender equality. However, existing reporting methodologies show significant discrepancies and are often complex to implement and insufficient for external stakeholders to validate official figures and compare with other donors. In addition, by using commitment figures targeting gender – instead of actual disbursements – the EU is reporting a better performance than is actually matched by real spending.

OECD DAC figures reporting on the gender equality markers show that between 2016 and 2017 there was an overall increase of around 11% in EU Member States’ ODA aimed at gender equality. This places the average contribution from Member States to the G1 marker (significant objective) and G2 marker (principal objective) actions at 45% in 2017. Of these, only 5% were allocated to projects that included gender equality as the principal objective (G2).

Looking at the European Commission, preliminary data indicates an increase by 15% of ODA to G1 and G2 markers combined in 2018. Contributions to G1 represented 40% of ODA and those to G2 only 4%. However, over half of the European Commission-funded projects which have been screened were found not to target gender equality but rather to ‘doing no harm’ in reinforcing gender inequalities. Although these funds may be defined as ‘gender sensitive’, as they are subject to a gender analysis, they do not advance gender equality.

Table 2: The gap to the 0.15-0.2% ODA/GNI to LDCs target

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total EU28 GNI</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid in € millions</td>
<td>% EU28 GNI represented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total EU28 GNI</td>
<td>15,588,949</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;ODA Commitment (0.15% of GNI)&quot;</td>
<td>23,383</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;ODA Commitment (0.2% of GNI)&quot;</td>
<td>31,178</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ODA</td>
<td>16,655</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Gap to 0.15%</td>
<td>6,729</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Gap to 0.20%</td>
<td>14,523</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CONCORD calculations based on EU data introduced in Council conclusions. Figures based on 2017 constant prices.

36 Based on available data for EU Member States that report to the OECD in addition to data from CONCORD’s national platforms. Average refers to bilateral allocable aid excluding non-screened activities under the gender markers. Data for 2018 is not available for all EU Member States.
According to the 2018 implementation report of the EU Gender Action Plan II, at the current pace the EU will not be able to meet its target of ensuring that 85% of all new programmes are marked G1 or G2 by 2020. In 2018, the European Commission (Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development) was at 68.4% compared with 65.9% in 2017 and 58.8% in 2016. As for EU Member States, they stood at 50.5% in 2018, compared with 50.1% in 2017. This shows there is still a long way to go for the EU and Member States to meet their targets.

**Graph 7: Meeting the GAIi 85% target**

In addition, the third GPEDC monitoring report found that only 43% of partner countries report an adequate allocation of resources to gender equality activities. Findings from the report indicate difficulties in methodically tracking allocations to gender equality, showing that most of the good intentions remain on paper.

**SUPPORT TO CSOS**

Civil society plays a key role in reducing inequalities. OECD DAC figures show that collective EU core support to civil society has been steady at around 3% of ODA in 2016 and 2017, while overall DAC donors’ contributions show a slight decrease in support to CSOs (from 2% to 1.7% of ODA). Evidence shows that civic space is seriously constrained in 109 countries around the globe, meaning business as usual and stagnating investments are not enough.

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41. As per figures reported to the OECD DAC.
As the new institutional cycle begins in 2019, the EU and its Member States must urgently:

- Adopt a Sustainable Europe 2030 Strategy with concrete measures to implement the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

**Enough ODA**

- Meet the international commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on ODA.
- Ensure that sufficient funding for development is allocated in the 2021–2027 MFF. EU ODA needs to focus even more on ending poverty and sustainable development which leaves no one behind, which is why at least 92% of NDICI must be used for ODA-eligible activities according to the current definition established by the OECD DAC.43

**Employing ODA correctly**

- Discount in-donor refugee costs, tied aid, in-donor international students costs, interest repayments and debt relief from ODA.
- Set a cap of maximum €10 billion as the amount to be provided from the EU budget for the EFSD+ guarantee. This is to ensure that the expansion of blending under the new MFF does not come at the expense of geographical programmes and other forms of development cooperation.
- Do not translate the increasing involvement of European companies in blending operations into increased tied aid.
- To be able to mitigate risks related to the use of the new OECD grant equivalent methodology, promote a thorough risk analysis of the potential impact of this shift in methodology in the OECD DAC.

**Effective ODA**

- Increase efforts to jointly identify and measure priorities with partner countries, drawing on partner countries’ objectives and results frameworks.
- In the ongoing negotiations on the next MFF, mitigate the risks of EU migration policies undermining partner countries’ ownership of development priorities, by rejecting all forms of conditionality on ODA related to EU donors’ migration policies. Also ensure that spending related to migration is based on need and there are sufficient risk analysis and accountability mechanisms to deter potential human rights abuses.
- Fully untie ODA, including to lower-middle-income countries, middle-income countries and all sectors, going beyond the minimum requirements of the OECD DAC.
- Make sure all EU Member States report in the upcoming GPEDC monitoring rounds.

**Equality-focused ODA**

- Meet the international commitment of spending 0.15 to 0.2% of GNI on ODA to LDCs.
- Reaffirm through the EU Gender Action Plan III that 85% of new programmes should have gender as a significant or principal objective (G1 or G2) and, within this target, 20% of programmes should have gender as a principal objective (G2). Gender equality will only be possible with adequate funding, so also commit to spending 85% of ODA in programmes with gender as a significant (G1) or principal objective (G2), of which 20% of ODA goes to programmes with gender equality as a principal objective (G2).
- Move towards a comprehensive and harmonised approach to EU reporting on gender targets, including by capturing all flows by EU institutions and reporting disbursement data (as opposed to commitment data) which reflects real spending.
- Invest more in strengthening civil society, particularly in partner countries through financial and non-financial resources.

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43 For the full CONCORD position on the MFF and NDICI negotiations see CONCORD, Multannual Financial Framework: Make it work for development! https://concordeurope.org/what-we-do/promoting-civil-society-space/eu-budget-mff-2021-2027
2. LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND

Inequality, exclusion and marginalisation are hampering progress on the SDGs. The whole sustainable development agenda is destined to fail if we do not change the policies and structures sustaining inequality across social, economic, political and environmental dimensions. With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the international community pledged to ‘leave no one behind’ and to ‘endeavour to reach the furthest behind first’. These commitments were recently reiterated at the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development in September 2019.\textsuperscript{44} But what does this mean in practice? According to the OECD, it boils down to “transforming policies and approaches, so that they assess how those left behind (or at risk) can be reached, monitor progress for these people and enable equality of opportunities”.\textsuperscript{45} But for the latter to be achieved, what is needed is a comprehensive approach to transform our economic, financial, political and social systems; to fairly redistribute income and wealth; and to monitor and make decisions based on the well-being of all people and the planet.\textsuperscript{46} ODA is a key tool contributing to redistribution efforts to tackle inequalities at local, country and global level. Hence this section looks at aid allocation with a view to harnessing its potential to target those left behind.

APPROACHES TO IDENTIFYING THE LEFT BEHIND

The principle of leaving no one behind has been interpreted and integrated into strategies at national and multilateral level in diverse ways. In the absence of a universal definition, identifying who is left behind and why is the first step needed to turn a commitment into a workable and practical concept – one that makes a real difference in reducing poverty and inequality for the people who are very hardest to reach. It is crucial to ensure that political and financial decisions support the people living in the direst situations of poverty and marginalisation.

In the European Consensus on Development, the EU and its Member States have pledged to give special attention to people who are in disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginalised situations and to introduce measures to “better target, protect and support them so as to offer them the same opportunities and ensure non-discrimination”. The Consensus also reconfirms the rights-based approach as a working methodology to promote ‘inclusion and participation, non-discrimination, equality and equity, transparency and accountability’. Leave no one behind and the rights-based approach are meant to guide the European Commission’s actions on development cooperation, but it is not possible to analyse how they are operationalised given that this information is not made available to the public. There is also no systematic approach or methodology to identify those left behind and several Member States have not yet translated their commitments on leaving no one behind into national policy (see more in Box 6).

In an attempt to reduce extreme poverty, inequalities, exclusion and discrimination and promote human rights, existing approaches to leaving no one behind have tended to target the poorest countries or people. And yet research shows that aid is not targeted where it is most needed. The countries where 75% of the world’s poorest people live received 35% of ODA in 2016, while countries where less than 1% of the world’s poorest people live received 25%.\textsuperscript{47} Countries with the lowest public revenue receive 10 times less aid per person living in extreme poverty than middle-income countries.\textsuperscript{48} More than three-quarters (77%) of private finance mobilised by ODA went to middle-income countries. In recipient countries, aid does a poor job of targeting marginalised places and people, and looking at key SDGs sectors such as education, health and energy, aid is under-serving large segments of populations who need it most.\textsuperscript{49}

At country level, the most well-known classifications of poverty are based on GNI per capita (including low and middle-income countries) and used by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and OECD to assess and compare countries.\textsuperscript{50} A different approach is to include vulnerability criteria that go beyond income-based lists. In the case of LDCs, not only is per capita GDP growth often significantly below the levels needed to end extreme poverty,\textsuperscript{51} but they also have the least ability to lift themselves from poverty without external support. Similar needs exist in fragile states. It is estimated that more than 80% of the world’s poorest people may be living in fragile

\textsuperscript{44} UN, Political declaration of the high-level political forum on sustainable development convened under the auspices of the General Assembly, Sep 2019, https://undocs.org/en/A/HLPF/2019/l.1


\textsuperscript{46} CONCORD, Inequalities unwrapped: an urgent call for systemic change, forthcoming in Nov 2019


\textsuperscript{50} The threshold of extreme poverty defined as people living with less than $1.90 a day is not sufficient to reduce poverty and inequality.

contexts by 2030 and of 157 countries for which data on SDG progress are available, fragile states consistently rank in the lowest third.\textsuperscript{52} Leaving no one behind by necessity means focusing on LDCs and fragile states, and the EU has recently reconfirmed its intention to “target resources to where the need is greatest, especially LDCs and countries in states of fragility and conflict”.\textsuperscript{53}

The European Commission applies a methodology for initial country allocations according to country needs, capacities, commitments, performance and potential EU impact.\textsuperscript{54} While this approach is commendable, it is not clear how the methodology applies beyond initial allocations, for instance when resources are adjusted during annual EU budget procedures. In addition, because the EU formula is not mainstreamed beyond the European Development Fund and the Development Cooperation Instrument, the rest of the EU’s ODA that comes from other instruments in the current MFF ‘Global Europe’ Heading is not necessarily allocated following a rights-based approach.

In addition, some country groups have also been identified by development stakeholders as patently unable to ensure that no one is left behind, given their current and future political and financial situations. These assessments are based on the proportion of people living in poverty and projections of further poverty concentration. More than 80% of all people in extreme poverty are projected to live in the 31 ‘Severely Off Track Countries’ (SOTC) by 2030, a group identified by low government effectiveness, weak private sector, conflict and violence, natural hazards and environmental risk.\textsuperscript{55} These countries currently receive less than a quarter of total ODA, of which about half goes to just four countries.\textsuperscript{56} Other efforts to identify countries in need include the 28 ‘Severely Poverty Challenged Countries’ (SPCC), estimated to have a proportion of people living in extreme poverty of more than 20% in 2030,\textsuperscript{57} and the “Countries Being Left Behind” (CBLB), expected to be home to around 80% of poor people by 2030.\textsuperscript{58} Despite using different methodologies,\textsuperscript{59} there is an overlap of around 20 countries with very high levels of poverty.\textsuperscript{60} These countries, key to leaving no one behind, receive only 10% of ODA from the EU and its Member States.\textsuperscript{61} Poverty projections for these countries confirm previous evidence noting that poverty will be increasingly concentrated in fragile states and LDCs.\textsuperscript{52} Of these countries, all but one are also LDCs and only five are not fragile states.\textsuperscript{63}

When looking at countries’ abilities to finance key priorities themselves, the picture changes. A list of ‘Severely Financially Challenged Countries’ (SFCC) goes beyond tracking poverty alone and considers countries’ financial capabilities to finance the estimated costs of core social sectors.\textsuperscript{64} A comparison with the SPCC list, for example, importantly highlights the risk of focusing exclusively on poverty indicators and disregarding countries’ own capacities to cover costs, when targeting additional financial resources.\textsuperscript{65} Comparing SFCCs with the overlap list of countries with highest levels of poverty, it is possible to identify a minimum core group of 16 countries most in need of resources according to all of these methodologies. Yet just 8% of EU aid is going to this group.\textsuperscript{66} Only two\textsuperscript{67} of the poorest and most financially challenged countries feature among the largest ten recipients of EU aid\textsuperscript{68} and only four\textsuperscript{69} are in the largest twenty list.\textsuperscript{70} What’s more, half\textsuperscript{71} of the largest ten recipients are not in any of the country groups listed here,\textsuperscript{72} including LDCs.

59 Current rates of poverty (Development Initiatives), future poverty rates assuming past economic growth rates (ODI) and future poverty rates based on IMF-projected economic growth rates (Brookings).
61 They received 9% in 2016, 10% in 2017.
63 Nigeria is not an LDCs and Benin, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi and Zambia are not fragile states.
65 Five severely poverty-challenged countries can fully fund their own costs and ten of the severely financially challenged countries have poverty rates of less than 20%.
66 This was 7% in 2016, 8% in 2017.
67 Afghanistan and Somalia.
68 Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, West Bank and Gaza Strip.
69 Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and South Sudan.
70 In addition to the largest 10: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen.
71 India, Iraq, Morocco, Turkey, West Bank and Gaza Strip.
72 Severely off-track countries, severely poverty-challenged countries, countries being left behind, severely financially challenged countries and LDCs. India, Morocco and Turkey are also not fragile states.
Identifying the most marginalised people – wherever they are – what keeps them behind and how to close the inequality gap is another suggested approach for targeting support. Some of the most notable efforts include the P20 Initiative, which proposes to identify the poorest 20% of people in countries globally, and the World Bank’s Shared Prosperity approach, which targets the growth in income of the poorest 40% of people in each country. Among EU Member States, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) approach is interesting as it uses its multidimensional poverty analysis tool to look at contextual factors (political/institutional, conflict, economic/social, environmental) and aspects of poverty (opportunities and choice, human security, power and voice, resources) to identify who is excluded and marginalised in each country. It then designs its approach to meet their needs. Other approaches have looked into specific factors that affect people who are consistently excluded or discriminated.

The European Consensus’ commitment ‘wherever people live’, linked to leave no one behind, lists examples such as ethnicity, gender, age, disability, religion or beliefs, sexual orientation and gender identity and migration status or other factors. According to the OECD, besides income poverty, the most common drivers of marginalisation include fragility, governance, climate change, gender, youth and disability. An analysis of 2018 UN Voluntary National Reviews shows that persons with disabilities, children and youth, women and elderly people are the groups most often cited as being left behind or at risk of being left behind.

Since leaving no one behind is an overarching pledge, it needs to apply across SDGs and targets. Deciding to focus on certain groups or sectors without an in-depth, context-specific analysis, poses the risk of exacerbating the marginalisation of other groups. This is why ultimately, focusing on leaving no one behind needs to be based on a case-by-case national analysis across geography, discrimination, governance, socioeconomic status, shocks and fragility, and most importantly, intersectionality between these factors. Understanding the multiple overlapping layers of discrimination and how they exacerbate marginalisation is key to addressing inequality. This is also the approach recommended by the UN, which has published step-by-step guidelines to help governments operationalise the leave no one behind pledge.
SCALING UP DATA- DISAGGREGATION EFFORTS

For everyone to be included in SDG progress, everyone needs to be counted. But existing statistics and standard survey tools are insufficient to identify those left behind and a lack of sub-national data often masks disparities within communities and households.81 The poorest 20% of the global population currently account for 55% of unregistered births.82 How can governments target resources towards people left behind if they don’t know they exist? The realities of marginalised people are highly complex and information on them often does not exist. Gathering, analysing and using high-quality disaggregated data will contribute to making uncounted people visible. The 2030 Agenda calls on all countries to identify who is left behind across income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability and geographic location. However, not only are efforts to disaggregate data for these categories insufficient, but the list might not capture the ‘statistically invisible’ people, that marital status, cast, LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex), unregistered people and other categories are an indicator of.83 While the European Commission acknowledges the need to strengthen data-disaggregation efforts, the only categories it refers to remain gender, children, young people and persons with disabilities.84 Not only is this not a comprehensive approach, but it can also lead to confusion. For example, the lack of a legal definition of young people makes it hardly a consistent category.

New technologies – big data,85 citizen-generated data and geospatial data86 – have a transformative potential to fill these gaps and can integrate official data from national statistical offices,87 administrative data and qualitative efforts.88 Additional sources are particularly needed given that even when significant efforts are made to collect, for example, GDP data, results remain partially unreliable due to a lack of a truly harmonised approach. Lastly, it is also crucial that mechanisms are put in place to listen to the people who are left behind themselves.89 For instance, the ‘Leave No One Behind Partnership’ of 12 international CSOs has launched a community-driven data pilot project capable of ‘building a bridge’ between gaps in statistical monitoring and policy-making.90 Gathering disaggregated data needs financing. Yet, the share of ODA focused on data and statistics is just 0.33%91 – half the amount estimated to meet the needs of recipient countries.92

FUNDING LEAVE NO ONE BEHIND

Reducing inequalities between countries, and reaching the people furthest behind within countries, will require a substantial increase in both private and public investments and significant global redistribution of resources towards those who are left behind. While, in terms of volume, ODA plays a modest role in the total resources needed to realise the 2030 Agenda, OECD DAC members have acknowledged that it has a specific comparative advantage in leaving no one behind.93 Thanks to its concessional nature and clear poverty reduction objective, ODA can focus on the most in need – such as LDCs and fragile and conflict-affected countries – which are less likely to attract other sources of financing. ODA can target the riskiest contexts and the most marginalised people in a way that other flows cannot, especially when they seek financial or commercial returns. This is why a ‘value-for-money’ approach – mentioned most recently in the mission letter to the new EU International Partnership Commissioner94 – cannot take priority over ensuring that no one is left behind.

According to the World Bank, 35 low-income countries still collect less than 15% of GDP in taxes. Domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) needs scaling up: only 0.18% of global ODA goes to DRM,95 even though strengthening public revenue is vital to reducing dependency on aid and for development
objectives to be met in the long term. In the meantime, ODA remains indispensable to bridge the gap and support people’s access to basic services. 98 Given that the inherent purpose of development assistance is to promote long-term economic development and welfare, ODA can be oriented towards services with higher social returns.97 Ensuring that ODA is focused on reducing both poverty and inequality is crucial to make good on the leave no one behind pledge. Resources must be targeted towards the people who need them most, for example by investing in essential services and sectors proven to tackle inequality, such as public health, education, universal social protection schemes, water and sanitation and small-scale agriculture. 98 ODA is also best placed to strengthen state institutions’ accountability and support structural reforms towards more redistributive and equal tax systems.

Poverty, marginalisation and exclusion must be considered together with the resources and capacity that domestic institutions have to address domestic problems. Where these resources are low, using aid to strengthen country systems and support country ownership, including through budget support and DRM, helps to sustainably increase the impact of these resources on the poorest people. When domestic resources are growing more rapidly, ODA can provide technical support to deliver services. Civil society plays a huge role in holding governments to account on the targeting of resources and ensuring that financing tackles poverty and inequality.

In an effort to scale up the contributions of different types of finance, ODA has been increasingly used to leverage additional contributions from the private sector. This has created a tension between, on the one hand, the tendency of gearing such resources towards countries and sectors with a private sector-friendly environment and, on the other hand, the urgency to focus on the countries and social sectors of highest priority to people living in situations of poverty and inequality. Subsidising private investment in line with national development strategies, for instance to support micro, small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to finance and open up markets to benefit poor people, can contribute to leaving no one behind. However, existing research indicates that donor engagement with the private sector could exacerbate inequalities. Research on aid effectiveness shows that out of 900 analysed projects involving the private sector, only 4% of them focused on the poorest.99

BOX 5: INTEGRATED NATIONAL FINANCING FRAMEWORKS

The financial needs to achieve the 2030 Agenda demand both significant increases in resources and changes in the way existing resources are used and prioritised through more effective and integrated approaches to managing different types of financing. To address this, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda called for cohesive nationally owned sustainable development strategies, supported by integrated national financing frameworks (INFFs). Meanwhile it reiterated that each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development. While the UN is leading on the development of a methodology for such INFFs, it is important to remember that democratic country ownership should be squarely at the centre of this process and that no guidelines should be published without endorsement from partner countries, in consultation with civil society. While country ownership is crucial, it is important that the responsibility for financing the SDGs is not completely shifted to partner countries. For these frameworks to work, they should be premised on robust regulatory frameworks for capital markets, which would otherwise be highly unpredictable and may nullify any efforts directed at financial planning. In addition, if INFFs are meant to form and implement a strategic, holistic, results-driven approach to development financing and as such guide investments according to needs, then it is paramount that leaving no one behind is inherently embedded in the INFFs. The EU should exert its convening power to ensure country ownership at each step of the process and that leaving no one behind is front and centre in the INFF methodology; while ensuring that the implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda remains focused on systemic issues, from global governance to foreign investments and debt relief.

MEASURING PROGRESS ON LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND

Along with the challenges in identifying who is left behind, another hard task is finding and using specific targets and indicators to measure both progress – as in efforts made by donors – and outcomes for those left behind. A lot of thinking across the development community has gone into debating the principles that should guide identification, but more is needed on ways to ensure progress is made and results are achieved. Nevertheless, a few initiatives have recognised the urgency to hold governments accountable for mainstreaming leaving no one behind in their policy, programming and funding decisions. While each local situation is different and as such would require

local indicators, it is useful to track global efforts and hold donors to account. This is the attempt of the ‘Leave no one behind index’, developed by the Overseas Development Institute, which monitors the extent to which the Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs are equipped to meet the commitment. Another global approach is the aforementioned P2O Initiative, using income, nutrition and civil registration to assess progress for the poorest 20% of the population.

The international community has also been busy developing further indicators for the SDGs. But the question is whether the leave no one behind pledge warrants a specific cross-cutting measure to reflect its nature. The UN recommends complementing the SDG indicators to obtain a ‘fuller picture’, capable of capturing the complex reality and subtleties of discrimination. In addition to quantitative outcome indicators, it suggests measuring commitments, efforts and results and to set local equity targets tackling discrimination and inequality. Locally meaningful targets are indeed best placed to bring about the change needed, and this approach meaningfully tracks both progress and results.

However, most efforts so far follow a sectoral approach and have mostly focused on age, gender and disability. For instance, the World Health Organization is developing a gender, equity and human rights marker meant to apply to all its programmes. The European Commission department for humanitarian aid (DG ECHO) has been piloting indicators to measure disability inclusion. Among civil society efforts, Humanity & Inclusion has developed a twin-track approach to disability, gender and age equality that includes a marker to assess whether programmes are unaware, aware, responsive or transformative of the three factors and help set time-bound targets. The OECD DAC contributes with requirements to report on a gender equality policy marker and recently adopted a voluntary policy marker ‘to track development finance in support of persons with disabilities’. This is part of the efforts by the Working Party on Development Finance Statistics (WP-STAT) to improve monitoring in line with the SDGs. The OECD found that for some SDGs (including SDG10 on inequality), no direct link with existing purpose codes and policy markers can be established and therefore the best approach is to introduce a voluntary reporting methodology (as of 2020) based on a new SDG focus field. Among DAC members, there is no results approach focusing on leave no one behind at this stage but several members have reported using indicators on poverty, inequality, vulnerability and exclusion.

In a similar sectoral fashion, the EU is tracking progress through the internationally agreed targets of spending 0.15 to 0.2% of GNI on ODA to LDCs, and through internally agreed EU commitments. This is to ensure that 20% of EU ODA is invested in social inclusion and human development, that 85% of new actions score G1 or G2 on the OECD gender equality policy marker, and that 25% of EU budget expenditure contributes to climate objectives. These targets – which are under discussion as part of negotiations on the NDICI – are helpful to scrutinise efforts but must be complemented by a systemic approach looking at the leave no one behind pledge in its entirety. The revised EU Results Framework meant to illustrate the EU’s contribution to the progress of partner countries towards the SDGs – lists leaving no one behind as an indicator under SDG1 but does not report any outputs nor outcomes from EU interventions. However, the European Commission made some proposals on inequality in its recently published report on implementing the new European Consensus on Development, focusing on ‘Addressing inequality in partner countries’. The Commission Staff Working Document lists two ex-ante indicators among possible options to further integrate reducing inequality in EU development for the SDGs.

110 OECD, How are Development Assistance Committee members answering the pledge of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development? Nov 2018, www.oecd-library.org/docserver/aad228d-en.pdf?expires=1564598643&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=FC7C02A5CE5E0F9204332BCD68107DA

CONCORD AidWatch 2019 - Leaving no one behind: Time for implementation
cooperation. An ‘equality marker’115 would record whether an intervention targets inequality as one of its stated objectives and a second indicator would record the anticipated share of project/programme benefits targeted to the poorest 40% of people by income distribution (corresponding to SDG target 10.1). While these would apply in forming new programmes and projects, additional ‘inequality-related indicators’ would need to be included in programmes and projects’ monitoring systems and reports. The Commission is approaching the task with a welcome systematic mindset, intending to mainstream reducing inequality in the EU programme and project cycle. However, these initial proposals need further fleshing out to identify which specific indicators best capture the multiple dimensions of inequality – going beyond mere income measures – and to address implementation concerns. The recommendations of a broader measurement framework including ‘framing indicators’ to reflect context in each country119 should be taken into account.

BOX 6: LEAVE NO ONE BEHIND APPROACHES ACROSS EU MEMBER STATES116

There is much room for improvement when it comes to implementing the leave no one behind pledge across EU Member States. Only five countries have so far included plans on how to operationalise leave no one behind in their development strategies, with only the UK having introduced a targeted ‘Leave No One Behind Promise’. Fourteen countries and the EU institutions have made some progress by either acknowledging the importance of the principle or focusing their efforts on particular sectors, groups or countries. The most common approaches include strategies on gender equality (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, UK), youth (UK) or children (Italy, Belgium), disability (Finland, Germany, Italy, UK), sexual minorities (Belgium, Finland) and climate change (Ireland, France). Some countries chose to focus on geographical areas such as LDCs and fragile states (Belgium) or Africa (Germany). Eight Member States have not yet incorporated the commitment into their national plans.

In terms of data disaggregation, while some countries have made efforts to report on certain categories, the most recurring remain only age (Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden), gender (Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, UK) and disability (Finland, Germany, Sweden, UK) but only very rarely with a systematic approach. Barely any country has proven to be using these data to identify those left behind. The UK has adopted a “Data Disaggregation Action Plan”117 and an ‘Inclusive Data Charter Action Plan”118 which commit to disaggregating data by sex, age, disability status and geography, and included plans for better sharing, reporting and use of data. A couple of Member States are making efforts to engage in strategic partnerships with civil society representing marginalised or excluded groups.

For example, Finland is systematically supporting CSOs working to increase awareness on the rights of persons with disabilities, Luxembourg works with NGOs promoting the rights of indigenous people, Sweden’s Sida is co-organising the Stockholm Civil Society Days 2019 on leaving no one behind with CONCORD Sweden.

The large majority of Member States do not measure progress to leave no one behind. Most targets rely on existing international commitments. However, Ireland pledged to spend 50% of its aid on LDCs, Belgium 50% of aid on LDCs and fragile states and the UK 50% of aid on fragile states. A few countries are looking into or have already adopted cross-cutting measuring frameworks. For example, the French development agency introduced a ‘100% social link’ to ensure that every project it finances contributes to reducing inequalities and enhancing access to social services. A group of academics was tasked with formulating proposals on how Belgium can monitor leaving no one behind. Hungary is elaborating a monitoring and evaluation handbook based on OECD DAC guidelines which is expected to contain explicit indicators and markers on leaving no one behind. Germany is piloting an inequality diagnostic tool and developing a poverty analysis tool to better understand causes and drivers of inequality and poverty in partner countries.

Overall, Member States have admitted to various challenges in incorporating a leave no one behind approach into their development policies and ODA allocation. The most common include low quality information and data gaps on who is left behind, where and why, the higher cost of reaching poor and marginalised people in hard-to-access areas, political and cultural disincentives to include all groups in development, lack of coordination between ministries, lack of a definition, and budgetary/resource constraints.

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115 Three levels of ‘E-marker’ are proposed to be adopted: i) E-0: when inequality reduction is not targeted, ii) E-1: when inequality reduction is a significant objective, iii) E-2: when inequality reduction is the principal objective.

116 Based on research from CONCORD’s national platforms and members.


### Box 7: LNOB index for EU Member States and Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Has the LNOB principle been incorporated in member states’ development cooperation policy?</th>
<th>Are member states using disaggregated data to identify those left behind?</th>
<th>Are member states tracking progress on the implementation of LNOB?</th>
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120 Red: leave no one behind is not mentioned, Orange: leave no one behind is mentioned but no reference to implementation approach OR it is not mentioned but some sectorial efforts are in place, Green: leave no one behind is translated into principles, definitions and/or guidelines for implementation.

121 Red: Member States are not disaggregating data or have not identified categories for disaggregation, Orange: Member States are disaggregating for some categories but it is unclear whether this information is used to identify those left behind, Green: Member States are using at least some data disaggregation to inform decisions on who is left behind.

122 Red: no measure of progress nor outcome on leave no one behind, Orange: some targets on sectors, groups or countries measure progress against leave no one behind, Green: comprehensive approach measuring outcome against leave no one behind.

123 No information on Cyprus is available.
Leaving no one behind requires curbing inequalities between people, groups and places. It means stamping out existing discrimination and exclusion both between and within countries while prioritising the people furthest behind. ODA is a scarce resource with unique potential to be targeted where other resources are not available and where it can drive improvements in people’s well-being. But existing data shows that ODA allocation is failing to reach those that need it most. The EU must build on existing efforts and better align ODA resources, budgetary and programming decision-making with evidence of high levels of poverty and inequality. To do so, it must agree on how it intends to identify those left behind, invest in data disaggregation and measure progress.

IDENTIFYING THE LEFT BEHIND

Leaving no one behind means adopting a ‘people-centred’ approach that puts the most marginalised people at the heart of governments efforts. Identifying who those people are must be a bottom-up approach driven by local actors. If focusing on people means targeting the poorest and most marginalised wherever they are, it is also important to take into account the resources that partner countries have to address the rights of those individuals. This is why the EU must carry out a thorough identification process focusing both on:

- Most marginalised, excluded or discriminated people: indicators must go beyond income poverty measures and cover social, political and environmental inequality as well as intersectionality between factors.
- Poorest and most financially challenged countries: identified through a combination of poverty and marginalisation indicators (not only GDP) as well as data on the countries’ ability to finance SDG progress by themselves. These include LDCs and fragile states, where external financing is indispensable to address critical needs vital to leaving no one behind.

INVESTING IN DATA DISAGGREGATION

Decision-making can only be as good as the data on which it is based. The EU must ramp up its efforts to significantly improve the quality and coverage of data by:

- Scaling up support for partner countries’ and donor institutions’ statistical capacity.
- Increasing investments in collecting and analysing disaggregated data, supporting partner countries’ efforts, at a minimum for the following categories: income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability and geographic location.
- Evaluating needs for data disaggregation for additional categories in dialogue with partner countries at local level and during consultations ahead of the next EU programming phase.

FUNDING LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND

ODA budgetary allocations as part of the EU’s MFF as well as programming decisions must be backed by the results of the needs-based identification process. To ensure EU ODA responds to the pledge of leaving no one behind, it must:

- Focus on reducing poverty and inequality.
- Invest in the sectors that contribute to reducing inequality such as public health, education, social protection and small-scale agriculture.
- Support Domestic Resource Mobilisation.
- Support private sector investments if they have demonstrated additionality, development results, adherence to international principles for effective private sector engagement – particularly on leaving no one behind – and respect human rights, gender equality, environmental and due diligence standards. An EU Action Plan on responsible business conduct would be a welcome framework for these efforts.
- Ensure country ownership and CSO consultation in the process leading up to INFF methodology and during the elaboration of INFFs, and align this with the principle of leaving no one behind.

RECOMMENDATIONS

124 The five principles identified by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation are: 1) inclusive country ownership, 2) results and targeted impacts, 3) inclusive partnerships, 4) transparency and accountability, 5) leave no one behind. https://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/SCM17-Private-Sector-Engagement-Principles.pdf

Both universal and targeted approaches are needed to leave no one behind and tackle the systemic nature of inequality in our system. To track these efforts, the EU must adopt an economic paradigm shift away from focusing on GDP growth and income-based measures alone and towards indicators that weigh the well-being of all, by:

- Measuring leave no one behind outcomes by adopting a systematic approach and multi-layered methodology which includes income-based inequality indicators and measures qualifying the inequality context at local level (such as governance and institutional factors, urban–rural divide, health and education inequality, and gender differences). The EU should build on its proposals under the 2019 Consensus implementation report on inequality and further flesh out a comprehensive universal approach.

- Measuring progress on groups of people, countries and sectors which are lagging behind, by reporting against:
  - the OECD policy markers on gender (with a view to meeting the target of 85% of new actions scoring G1 or G2, and at least 20% of those with gender equality as a principal objective) and disability;
  - the target of allocating 50% of NDICI allocations for climate and environment relevant actions;
  - the target of allocating at least 20% of EU ODA to social inclusion and human development;
  - the target of investing 0.2% of the EU’s GNI on LDCs.

- Reporting on leaving no one behind implementation efforts as part of the UN Voluntary National Reviews system as well as the annual reports on the implementation of the European Union’s instruments for financing external actions.
The Agenda 2030 is a golden opportunity for Europe. The European Commissioner for International Partnerships delivers on the implementation of the SDGs in the world. My ambition is to eradicate poverty, [in line] with our values of human rights and human dignity… I am committed to fighting inequality, supporting the least developed countries and promoting sustainable development.”

Jutta Urpilainen, Commissioner-designate for International Partnerships, European Parliament Hearing, October 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

In 2018, the EU institutions provided €13.6 billion in ODA. While they remained the fourth biggest global donor, their contribution represented a 6% decrease from 2017, a further step back from the €15.9 billion contributed in 2016. Both tied aid and interest repayments amounts were reduced in 2018, which is good news. But overall multilateral and bilateral aid also went down, despite expected increases in line with the 2014–2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

The 2018 OECD DAC Peer Review of the EU – which covered activities up to 2017 – recommended that the EU uses its coordinating role more effectively in encouraging member states to meet their ODA commitments. This is even more relevant given the drop in EU aid and the ongoing discussions on the 2021–2027 MFF, which will allocate EU resources up to just three years before the deadline to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

The EU has seen much institutional change in 2019, with a new European Parliament settling in over the summer and a new Commission expected to take office by the end of the year. Incoming Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that each Commissioner will have to ensure the delivery of the SDGs. She also stated that bilateral funding should adapt “to achieve the EU’s objectives on migration management”. Confirming a trend that risks instrumentalising development cooperation to the benefit of EU interests is particularly worrying in that the most critical interventions for reaching the most marginalised people may not be in line with this ‘mutual benefit’ rationale.

The new Commissioner-designate for International Partnerships, Jutta Urpilainen, has importantly committed to fighting inequalities and to doing development “for people, not for companies”. The latter is especially significant in the context of the vested need to put a stronger focus on leveraging private capital as a way to complement insufficient ‘traditional measures of aid delivery’ and ‘value for money’. As evidence of development additionality and effectiveness remains scarce, a more cautious approach to blending, in line with international standards for private sector engagement, is needed.

The 2021–2027 programming cycle will kick-off at the beginning of 2020 and will be a key moment to turn these statements and the commitments made in the 2017 European Consensus on Development into targeted action, in partnership with local actors and Member States.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EU INSTITUTIONS

- Increase ODA in the 2021–2027 MFF to meet the long-standing commitments of 0.7% of ODA/GNI and 0.15–0.2% of ODA/GNI to LDCs.
- Translate European Consensus commitments into concrete actions on how to implement the SDGs and identify who will be responsible for carrying out each action.
- Make sure aid allocations through programming are in line with the principle of ‘leaving no one behind’, including when in conflict with a ‘mutual interest’ or ‘value for money’ rationale, to ensure the poorest, most marginalised and hardest-to-reach are prioritised.
- Ensure private sector engagement follows a people-centred approached and base decisions on the use of ODA for blending on evidence demonstrating development impact.
The Three-Year Programme on Austrian Development Policy is based on country ownership, partnership and a human rights-based approach. In this programme, we also focus on providing direct assistance in the field with the clear aim of reducing migration flows."

Karin Kneissl, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Integration and Foreign Affairs, September 2018

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

Austria’s ODA dropped from 0.30% of GNI in 2017 to 0.26% in 2018, due to the decline of in-donor refugee costs. However, even excluding refugee costs, ODA decreased by 5% compared with the previous year, despite announced increases by the former Foreign Minister Kurz in 2016. The new Three-Year Programme on Austrian Development Cooperation Policy contains a stronger emphasis on fighting root causes of irregular migration, which links development cooperation to the government’s security policy. While Foreign Minister Kneissl introduced a focus on gender equality and women empowerment, no significant increases in funding addressing these priorities occurred. Although Austrian development cooperation identified focus countries, only two of these (Uganda, Ethiopia) are in the largest ten ODA recipient countries. Austria also spent less on LDCs, down from €49.5 million in 2017 to €45 million in 2018. Funding for bilateral humanitarian assistance drastically fell from €52 million in 2017 to €23 million in 2018, representing only €2.6 per person in Austria. Despite promises to increase the Foreign Disaster Relief Fund, only €15 million (compared with €20 million in 2017) was budgeted for each of 2018 and 2019. In 2018, €20 million was spent from the Foreign Disaster Relief Fund, with an additional €5 million taken from reserves. The 2018 recommendations from the Austrian Court of Audit on how to increase efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda have not yet been realised by the government. It still lacks an overall strategy, goals and priorities and the allocation of additional budget for sustainable development to the federal ministries. The funding volume for global awareness-raising projects and development education stands at €4.2 million and has not been increased for several years. No adjustment to inflation has been made, resulting into a significant and accumulated decrease of 20% for civil society organisation (CSO) projects.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

Projections for 2019 indicate a further decline in ODA, though numbers were not available at the time of writing. The government has even projected steady decreases in the upcoming years to 0.24% by 2022. There is no binding roadmap nor a suitable timeline to increase ODA, which makes it even more unlikely that Austria will reach the 0.7% goal. Even though Austria will submit its Voluntary National Review for the first time in 2020, political commitment towards increasing efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs remains low. Since Austria held national elections in September 2019, the commitment of the new government to sustainable development and humanitarian assistance beyond 2019 remains unclear. Nevertheless, a change of policy towards raising ODA is not expected.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT

- Focus all development cooperation programmes exclusively on the goals of fighting multidimensional poverty and inequalities and leaving no one behind.
- Implement the commitment to raise ODA to 0.7% of GNI with a binding timetable and increase funds for gender equality and inclusion as well as global awareness-raising and development education.
- Increase the share of ODA to LDCs for poverty eradication.
- Develop a whole-of-government overall plan with priorities and measures to implement the 2030 Agenda and reach the SDGs, addressing policy coherence for sustainable development and including broad participation of civil society.
- Earmark funds of the Foreign Disaster Relief Fund to provide predictable financing for long and short-term relief and increase the fund from €15 to €60 million.

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The recent trajectory of Belgium’s ODA confirms that the quantity of aid is not a government priority, and ODA remains a budget adjustment variable. In 2018, Belgium’s ODA decreased again, to reach only 0.44% of its GNI. The 0.7% target has thus moved further away and Belgium remains below the European average; this is a logical consequence of the severe budget cuts and underspending since 2011. While some aid channels stabilised or even increased between 2017 and 2018, they are now at historically low levels. Indeed, since 2010, ODA has decreased by 13% in absolute terms, and fallen from 0.60% to 0.44% of Belgium’s GNI.

The decrease in Belgian ODA is also due to lower in-donor refugee costs counted as ODA, falling from €280 to €221 million in 2018. But if these amounts are compared with 2014, a spectacular increase of in-donor refugee costs over the longer period can be seen. Indeed, in 2015 Belgium became the largest recipient of its own development aid. Since then, in-donor refugee costs have always represented more than 10% of total ODA.

Another trend that has continued throughout 2018 is the increased focus on the role of the private sector in reaching the SDGs. A new financial instrument was created in 2018, the Business Partnership Facility, which uses ODA to allocate subsidies to the private sector to leverage private investments in developing countries. With no predefined geographic or thematic scope, the first call for proposals selected 11 very diverse projects in different regions. In parallel, Belgium has repeated its commitment towards untied aid as well as its support to the local private sector in developing countries.

A new law for development cooperation was also developed in 2018, even though it was not passed due to the fall of the federal government majority in December. According to the new legislation, the fight against (the root causes of/irregular) migration was to become an objective and an evaluation criterion of development cooperation, a condition for allocating budget support and a criteria for selecting partner countries. This showed the potential risks of ODA instrumentalisation for repressive migration objectives.

Belgium held elections in May 2019 but has still not been able to find a federal government majority at the time of writing. In the meantime, the private sector financing agenda can be expected to continue to rise. The growing tendency of instrumentalising ODA for repressive migration objectives could also dangerously lead to a diversion of Belgian aid away from LDCs and fragile states, through the introduction of new partner countries. This is a pity as Belgium has previously been applauded for its focus on the poorest countries.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT

• Adopt a budgetary plan to ensure Belgium will respect its 0.7% commitment by 2023.
• Continue to concentrate governmental ODA towards LDCs and fragile states with a clear and comprehensive strategy.
• Adapt the private sector strategy so as to support the local private sector as much as possible. And if leveraging international private sector funds, ensure they do not divert ODA but do provide additional sources of funding, meet transparency rules, respect development effectiveness principles and contribute to sustainable development on the ground.
• Refuse any instrumentalisation of aid for the economic, migration and security interests of Belgium or the EU.
There is political consensus in Bulgaria on the need for our country to join the OECD. I think in two and a half years we have achieved a lot and we are ready for membership in the organisation. We hope to receive an invitation to start negotiations soon – possibly next year.”

Ekaterina Zaharieva, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

In 2018 Bulgaria’s ODA levels reached their peak, with a total of €58 million (current prices) – 5.6% more than 2017 due to an increase in multilateral contributions – confirming the country’s ambition to gradually increase development aid. However despite these efforts, the share of ODA as a percentage of GNI remains 0.11%.

The largest share of development assistance (€43.65 million) was disbursed through the EU, followed by contributions (€4 million) to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, and to international organisations such as the UN and its agencies, the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization and others (€0.92 million). Bulgaria also provided €5.96 million in humanitarian aid, of which €3.9 million has been used to support refugees in Bulgaria. Bulgaria has provided €8.26 million for bilateral cooperation, €2.27 million of which went to finance administrative capacity building and socially significant infrastructure projects in the Western Balkans, the Black Sea region and Iraq.

In June 2018 Bulgaria became a participant in the OECD DAC.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

In 2019 the Council of Ministers launched the drafting process of a new strategic document for sustainable development to 2030. The draft of the new ‘National Development Programme: Bulgaria 2030’ should be adopted by the end of 2020 and will replace the existing ‘National Development Programme: Bulgaria 2020’. It is expected that the document will use the SDGs as a framework, taking into account the Bulgarian national context. It is anticipated that in 2020 Bulgaria will receive an official invitation to start negotiations to become a member of the OECD.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT

• Show political will to restart the process for developing a new law for development cooperation.
• Include SDG 17 and Bulgarian Development Policy in the draft of the new ‘National Development Programme: Bulgaria 2030’.
• Focus the new Mid-term Programme for Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid more on SDG implementation in line with the 2030 Agenda in priority countries.
• Introduce specific regulations to improve the involvement of CSOs and use their capacity in the implementation phase of development cooperation programmes.
• Implement a communication strategy that highlights the mutual benefits of participating in development cooperation policies for both donors and beneficiaries.
In the global development community the Republic of Croatia is a relatively small donor that cannot measure up to the official development assistance figures of the big global donors. However, Croatia’s own experience of the war-to-peace transition is unique in the global development community and certainly a comparative advantage in this niche, for which there is a constant need among the countries dealing with conflict, its causes and consequences."

National Strategy for Development Cooperation of the Republic of Croatia for the period 2017–2021

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

The National Strategy for Development Cooperation for the period 2017–2021, adopted by the Croatian Parliament, sets sectoral and geographic priorities based on foreign policy strategic goals, Croatia’s specific advantages as a donor country, and commitments and recommendations stemming from international agreements: the 2030 Agenda, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Agenda for Humanity resulting from the Istanbul Humanitarian Summit. The accompanying annual National Strategy Implementation Programme was also adopted by the government on 16 May 2018.

The National Strategy identifies three priority regions of ODA, and within them programme countries. These are Bosnia and Herzegovina in Southeastern Europe, Ukraine in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Jordan in its Southern Neighbourhood, while Afghanistan stands out among developing countries. In October 2018, the government established the Commission for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Abroad, chaired by the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs. The Commission brings together 33 departments, representatives of regional and local authorities, CSOs and academia. It met for the first time in December 2018.

According to Croatia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ report on ODA in 2017–2018, sectoral priorities have focused on the dignity of all people through investing in education, health, the protection and empowerment of women, children and youth; promoting the peace, security and development nexus; building democratic institutions by sharing Croatia’s experiences in wartime and post-war stabilisation of society; supporting responsible economic development through environmental protection; and promoting human rights.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2018 AND BEYOND

According to the National Strategy for Development Cooperation for 2017–2021, Croatia is aware of its comparative advantages and limited resources, and that by encouraging development, security and stability in other countries it also fosters these at home. Croatia will primarily promote mutual interdependence and coherence of peace, security and development. In this context, it will promote a comprehensive approach of the EU38 to transforming conflict into dialogue through early warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management, early recovery and sustainable reconstruction, stabilisation and peacebuilding, state-building, strengthening resilience to future crises and disasters, and long-term sustainable development. It is also necessary to continuously increase Croatia’s ODA allocations, and strengthen knowledge and awareness of its strategic importance among the citizens. Allocations for humanitarian assistance need to increase too; these were at 5% of ODA in 2018. And reporting and data transparency need to be significantly improved.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT

• Step up efforts to increase aid, honour Croatia’s commitments to ODA financing and develop and adopt a concrete timetable to reach ODA targets.
• Establish and maintain continuous communication and collaboration with CSOs in activities and projects related to international development cooperation and aid.
• Improve reporting and increase transparency on Croatia’s ODA spending.

CROATIA - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID
(€ million, constant 2017)*

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Multilateral ODA</th>
<th>Genuine bilateral aid</th>
<th>Refugees in donor countries</th>
<th>Student costs</th>
<th>Debt relief</th>
<th>Interest repayments</th>
<th>Gap to 0.33% of GNI</th>
<th>Tied aid</th>
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*2018 GNI was used at the same level as 2017, due to unavailability of updated data at the time of writing.
It is important both for the government and the business to increase trade between the Czech Republic and Africa. The government’s determination is key because without government support it would be very difficult to do business in Africa. Prosperity of Africa is also in the interest of Czechia so the people would not migrate from there to Europe.”

Martin Tlapa, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

Czech development cooperation reached another significant milestone in 2018, since its revival in 1995, with the first year of implementation of the new Development Cooperation Strategy of the Czech Republic 2018–2030. The strategy reflects some of the recommendations from the OECD DAC Peer Review, namely on concentrating aid to six priority countries and engaging the private sector in development cooperation including new financial instruments.

However, the new strategy is missing a concrete plan to meet the 0.33% ODA/GNI target by 2030. While the former 2010–2017 strategy included the commitment to increase ODA by 0.01% GNI annually, this is missing from the new strategy.

Another important change is a new set-up among actors responsible for development cooperation, including the redefinition of their roles and mandates. The responsibility of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has increased, especially around the identification of projects to be supported, while the mandate of the Czech Development Agency has rather shrunk to administration of selected programmes and projects.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

The OECD DAC Mid-term Review from June 2019 acknowledged the increase of Czech ODA in volume and percentage terms over the past three years but warned that growth rates are not enough to reach the 0.33% GNI target by 2030. The 2020–2022 approved plan for development cooperation with indicative budgets for bilateral cooperation confirms expected stagnation in the available budget.

Another worrying trend is stagnation or even a decrease in allocations for country programmes, including for LDCs, while the only increase in absolute terms is planned for financial instruments involving the private sector. This is in contrast with the recent evaluation of one of the blending facilities, a programme of development partnership for the private sector called B2B, which identified a lack of its development impact. If the budget for blending instruments should increase, their contribution to sustainable development of partner countries must be monitored and ensured.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CZECH GOVERNMENT

• Adopt a concrete plan to meet the 0.33% ODA/GNI target by 2030 and include longer-term indicative budgets in the country programmes for bilateral development cooperation.

• Increase focus on development effectiveness impact in partner countries.

• Increase systematic monitoring in line with the ‘leave no one behind’ and ‘reach the furthest behind first’ principles.

• Put in place a system for collecting and evaluating data for all goals and indicators included in the country programmes for bilateral development cooperation to enable their fulfilment to be assessed.

• Increase allocation of financial resources for global development education, particularly given the raising nationalist and xenophobic trends in Czech Republic.

CZECH REPUBLIC

0.13% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.14% TOTAL AID/GNI

CZECH REPUBLIC - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID

(€ million, constant 2017)
Private investments cannot solve all the challenges in developing countries. Over the past years, the rhetoric about their impact may generally have been a little too optimistic. However, it is certain that we need private investments in development cooperation, especially to ensure the transition to a sustainable future.”

Rasmus Prehn, Minister for Development Cooperation, September 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

In 2018, the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs celebrated that Denmark had spent at least 0.7% of GNI on development aid in 40 consecutive years. Ironically, 2018 is the year when Danish ODA was at its lowest point in the same four decades, with a contribution of 0.71% of GNI.

Danish aid priorities have increasingly become linked with its own interests, not least around the involvement of the Danish private sector and the ambition to use development cooperation to stem migration flows towards Europe and Denmark. This has entailed a focus on job creation and economic development in selected countries and plans to make aid conditional on partner countries’ willingness to cooperate on readmission of rejected asylum seekers.

In 2018, the government also planned to increase funding for blended finance projects, partly through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ own private sector platform and partly through IFU, Denmark’s development finance institution. Generally, blended finance and private sector partnerships have become more and more prominent both in rhetoric and money flows in Danish development cooperation.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

At the end of June 2019, a new minority government formed by the Social Democrats took office in Denmark. The new Minister for Development Cooperation soon after claimed that he wanted to be minister for solidarity, signalling a change in discourse from the previous centre-right government’s approach to development. The new government has however indicated that it probably will be satisfied with maintaining the current level of ODA.

The new government’s priorities in aid was released and the main areas of focus will be Africa, helping people in their own region, and strengthening climate action. It is yet unknown whether this ambition will translate into new and additional financial resources in 2020 or beyond.

Based on new reports revealing the limitations of blended finance and an evaluation of IFU showing a mixed bag of results, discussions on what the role of the private sector in development should be are growing. The new government has acknowledged the challenges in using blended finance as a tool in LDCs, but maintained the previous government’s line, that private sector partnerships and investments are crucial to reach the SDGs. The government will especially focus blended finance initiatives in supporting developing countries in a green transition.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DANISH GOVERNMENT

• Increase the level of ODA, which is at the lowest level in almost four decades, and ensure that ODA is genuinely used for reducing poverty.
• Make climate finance additional to ODA flows and targets.
• Put pressure on the EU to reach 0.7% target in the next Multiannual Financial Framework and on all EU member states to agree on binding timetables for reaching their individual aid quantity targets.
• Ensure that poverty reduction and human rights are the guiding principles of development cooperation, and when aid is used for migration purposes and private sector cooperation.

DENMARK - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID
(€ million, constant 2017)
In the near future, Estonia must also be able to engage more with issues related to the Southern Neighbourhood of the European Union. In development cooperation too we must look further ahead and focus on least developed countries. On the global scale, we have been a wealthy and very successful small state for years now, so it is the task of the next Riigikogu and government to find a way to attain the promised 0.33% of the GDP for development cooperation and humanitarian aid.”

Sven Mikser, former Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Estonian Parliament, February 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

The percentage of Estonia’s ODA/GNI has not changed in 2018, staying at 0.16%, as in 2017. The amount spent on development aid increased by €3.3 million (current prices). The main increase in absolute amounts came from multilateral payments, which increased by €4.5 million, while bilateral ODA decreased by €1.35 million.

The increase in ODA was expected, as Estonia is steadily increasing its ODA to meet the goal of 0.33% by 2030, which is also set in the upcoming Foreign Policy Development Plan 2030, yet to be finalised by the government and Estonian Parliament. The amount of support for LDCs grew in 2018, while allocations for gender were smaller than in 2017. The disbursements for refugee costs and peace and security were also smaller than in 2017.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

Since a drop in 2017, Estonian ODA trends show growth according to several strategies. The main focus is in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) as well as Afghanistan, which are the priority countries for Estonia. Estonia continues to promote the digital for development agenda, which was one of the key talking points with several developing nations during the Estonian campaign for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council 2020–2021, which Estonia successfully won.

One of the important developments since 2018 is the process of creating the Foreign Policy Development Plan 2030, which will be finalised by the end of 2019. This is the first time Estonia has developed an overarching strategy for its whole foreign policy. The preliminary version suggests that reaching the SDGs, as well as increasing ODA to reach 0.33%, will be prioritised.

**RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ESTONIAN GOVERNMENT**

- Show strong commitment to achieving the 0.33% ODA target by 2030 in the upcoming Foreign Policy Development Plan 2030.
- Show political will for policy coherence for sustainable development to make sure Estonia reaches its goals for the 2030 Agenda, especially in the development and climate policy sectors.
- Develop a system of impact assessment to improve aid effectiveness and the capacity of Estonian organisations to implement projects.
Our approach to the world is strongly based on values. This means new kind of boldness in defending the rule of law, including equality and the position of girls and women. Our perception of justice will be clearly visible in the development and asylum policy.”

Antti Rinne, Prime Minister of Finland, speech at the annual meeting of Heads of Missions in Helsinki, August 2019

**FINLAND**

**MAIN CHANGES IN 2018**

Finland’s development cooperation disbursements went down from 0.42% of GNI in 2017 to 0.36% in 2018. Three main reasons caused this decline: refugee and asylum seeker costs went down by €20 million, Finland’s contribution to EU development cooperation was reduced by €26 million and the development policy investments targeting private sector were less than expected.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs submitted a comprehensive Development Policy Results Report to the parliament, for the first time ever analysing and presenting Finland’s development cooperation results per each focus area and different instrument for 2015 to 2018. For example, with Finnish support, women have become more actively involved in decision-making and the economy and labour market and have been empowered to make decisions concerning their own bodies. Funds to CSOs helped to create 31,300 jobs of which 60% are for women. A total of 2,370 civil society actors received Finnish support through various channels between 2015 and 2017.

**TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND**

The 2019 programme of Prime Minister Antti Rinne titled ‘Inclusive and competent Finland – a socially, economically and ecologically sustainable society’, includes several positive commitments on sustainable development, development cooperation, civil society and climate change mitigation and adaptation. In line with its commitment to the UN, Finland aims to direct 0.7% of GNI to development cooperation and 0.2% of GNI to LDCs, and committed to prepare a roadmap and timetable for achieving all UN goals. The first state budget proposal for 2020 however shows only a modest increase in international development cooperation funding, aiming for 0.42% of GNI to be invested in ODA in 2020.

Finland aims to scale up climate finance as part of its development finance, thus not promising to channel any additional climate funding for adaptation to LDCs, which may affect the practical policy priorities shifting from poverty reduction elsewhere. The aim is to direct half of climate finance to climate change adaptation, through international funds and CSOs. Investment-based and loan-based finance will be continued, especially for boosting climate finance – this is not promising considering Finland’s international commitment of leaving no one behind, as blended finance has not reached LDCs en masse so far.

**RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT**

- Prepare a clear timeline with milestones for reaching the 0.7% ODA of GNI target and at least 0.2% of GNI to LDCs.
- Define more-specific climate funding criteria and channel income from the emission trade scheme to development and climate financing.
- Increase transparency of private sector instruments, including better-defined aid efficiency reporting mechanisms.
- Respect the commitments on gender, human rights and LDCs, especially when channelling ODA to the private sector.

**FINLAND**

**0.34% GENUINE AID/GNI**

**0.36% TOTAL AID/GNI**

**FINLAND - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID**

(€ million, constant 2017)

- Multilateral ODA
- Genuine bilateral aid
- Refugees in donor countries
- Student costs
- Debt relief
- Interest repayments
- Tied aid

- Gap to 0.7% of GNI
- 0.7 % GOAL
Our development policy is a policy which very directly answers to France’s interest, as showing from the priorities we set: crisis prevention, fight against the effects of climate change, promotion of men and women equality, fight against pandemics. But we need to gain in efficacy and in order to do so we should focus our efforts on where they are the most effective: priority countries, including Africa and crisis areas. For that purpose, we need sufficient means. For two years, we have been back on the rise. We are back on an ongoing raising trend. This trend will keep on with the goal for ODA to reach 0.55% of GNI in 2022.”

Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

On 8 February 2018, the French Prime Minister, at the President’s request, gathered the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development. This committee introduced ODA as one of the priorities of the current mandate and reaffirmed the general objectives of ending poverty, implementing the SGDs, achieving the Paris Climate Agreement and protecting global public goods. It established a year-on-year trajectory for ODA with the goal of reaching 0.55% of GNI in 2022 as a first step towards the 0.7%.

However, this trajectory is planning most of the increase for the end of the mandate, introducing doubts on the feasibility of this growth. Furthermore, in 2018 France spent 0.44% of its GNI on ODA.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

After the proportion of GNI allocated to ODA barely moved, from 0.43% in 2017 to 0.44% in 2018, the government increased the ODA budget for 2019 but to below what would be needed to give credibility to the trajectory towards the presidential goal for 2022. In 2019, ODA commitments increased but disbursements are left behind, jeopardising the increase of French aid, both in quantity and in quality.

France is revising its orientation and planning law on development and international solidarity with the ambition of reframing the policy to tackle global inequalities. Originally planned for 2019, this revision is now postponed to 2020. This could represent a great opportunity to insert a credible budgetary increase towards the 0.7% goal for 2025 into French legislation, as President Macron committed to during his campaign.

The increase of ODA planned in the current budget proposal for 2020 is, once again, beneath a progressive growth of ODA aiming for 0.55% of GNI by 2022, the term of the presidential mandate. This puts the enforcement of the conclusions of the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development at risk, especially the objective of dedicating more ODA as grants to LDCs. In a context where public speeches are increasingly inclined to support more conditionality of aid to the economic, migration and security interests of France, the embodiment of the leaving no one behind principle by the French government lacks consistency.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

- Increase ODA efforts towards the 0.7% target and integrate a budgetary trajectory in revising the law of orientation and planning relating to development policy and international solidarity.
- Guarantee an ambitious financial transaction tax for international solidarity and climate by increasing its rate from 0.3% to 0.5% and directing 100% of its revenue in favour of ODA.
- Improve the transparency and accountability of French aid.
- Measure and publish the impact of ODA on its beneficiaries to ensure coherence and compliance with the SDGs.
- Ensure policy coherence for sustainable development.

FRANCE - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID

(€ million, constant 2017)

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FRANCE - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID

(€ million, constant 2017)
Private investments are the key to development. By now, market potentials are enormous… It is time to dare investing in Africa.”

Dr Gerd Müller, Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, June 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

Despite being the second-largest donor country, providing €21.2 billion in ODA in 2018, there is a worrying declining trend in the share of German ODA as a percentage of its GNI. Standing at just 0.63%, Germany is failing to meet the 0.7% target reached for the first and only time in 2016, then due to changes in the way of reporting in-donor refugee costs. According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), priorities of German development cooperation continue to tackle the root causes of displacement and reintegrating refugees, stability and development in the Middle East and North Africa region, and food security. Since 2017 Germany has focused increasingly on mobilising private investment flows for sustainable development, namely through BMZ’s Marshall Plan and the G20 Compact with Africa.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

Despite an increase of German ODA to €22.6 billion in 2019, representing 0.65% of GNI, this trend is unlikely to continue in the next few years. In fact, if the government does not take action, German ODA is projected to decrease until the end of this legislative term, with an expected ODA share of 0.58% of GNI in 2021. This is despite the acting government having committed to the 0.7% target in its coalition treaty. The new Federal Government Africa Policy Guidelines agreed in March 2019 highlight support to civil society as one of five priorities. However, the current budget proposal for 2020 does not reflect this commitment and confirms the recent years’ stagnation of funds to NGOs at 11 to 12% of BMZ’s budget. Intensifying the attempts to catalyse private investment and job creation in Africa, BMZ’s Marshall Plan with Africa and the G20 Compact with Africa have been complemented with a new German Development Investment Fund planned to be equipped with €1 billion. A new special initiative on vocational training and employment supports the political goals of the Compact with Africa with announced funds amounting to €250 million.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

• Commit additional resources to development cooperation and humanitarian aid to reach the 0.7% target. Exclude in-donor refugee costs from ODA calculations and deliver climate finance in addition to the ODA needed to meet the 0.7% target.
• Use and strengthen the capacity of civil society, acknowledge its potential for sustainable development and increase CSO funding significantly. Enhance reliability of funding by also increasing its long-term perspective.
• Ensure policy coherence for human rights and sustainable development across all sectors. Further strengthen, prioritise and systematically implement the leave no one behind approach in German’s development policy and ODA allocation. As a concrete step, agree a roadmap to reach the committed 0.15 to 0.2% of GNI to LDCs.
• Make ODA funds available first and foremost for reducing poverty and ending social inequality. Only use these for supporting private investments if business activities are proven to achieve a sustainable development impact and fulfil socio-ecological and human rights minimum standards.
• Allocate more funding for the support of gender equality and the rights of women as the principal actors of sustainable development.
• Stop using aid as a tool for migration management and instead adopt a sustainable development-oriented and rights-based approach to migration and forced displacement. This should include establishing safe and legal migration routes as well as humanitarian aid for refugees and internally displaced persons.

![GERMANY - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID](€ million, constant 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Multilateral ODA</th>
<th>Genuine bilateral aid</th>
<th>Refugees in donor countries</th>
<th>Student costs</th>
<th>Debt relief</th>
<th>Interest repayments</th>
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Our commitment is for a renewed legal framework and bilateral programme and for ensuring that domestic and international policies are coherent with and contribute to Agenda 2030.”

Terens Nikolaos Quick, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

In 2018 there has been a slightly more active communication of the government and CSOs, mostly in relation to the preparation of the Voluntary Country Report that was presented at the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development in New York in July. The exchanges concerned how to implement the SDGs but were limited to gathering evidence of good practice on behalf of CSOs. The government did not make any effort to invite CSOs as stakeholders to discuss international development aid issues or to engage as partners on planning and implementing programmes addressing refugee issues and refugee costs.

ODA levels remained very low in 2018, reaching only 0.13% of GNI. This is not only due to lack of funds (due to austerity measures) but also because of a lack of an updated legal framework and plan for international aid.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

The victory of the 2019 parliament elections by the right-wing party New Democracy led to changes in the structure and roles of General Directors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new leadership has committed to present a new legal framework on international aid that will be open for public consultation before being finalised. The Hellenic Aid Department has also opened its offices and conducted a meeting with the Hellenic Platform — the first for many years — in an effort to re-establish good relations.

Although CSOs support such initiatives, more efforts are needed for the government to recognise CSOs as partners in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating international development and aid issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

• Include CSOs as stakeholders in the aid strategy and expand cooperation with them through participation in the inter-ministerial committee for the development and monitoring of the SDG strategy.
• Evaluate the 0.7% commitment under current fiscal conditions in order to recommit to a realistic and binding timetable to meet it in the future.
• Adopt and implement the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standard to increase the transparency and accountability of Greek ODA.
• Develop a policy which outlines criteria for selecting CSOs to partner with, as part of the recently announced new legal framework.
HUNGARY

Hungary is still committed to meeting the 0.33% ODA/GNI target set by the EU within the timeframe of the 2030 Agenda to further increase the volume of international development assistance.”

Voluntary National Review of Hungary on the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda, 2018

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

In 2018 total Hungarian ODA spending increased by 92% to €243 million (current prices), which represents 0.21% of GNI. Unlike in any previous year, this growth is partly due to bilateral ODA figures almost tripling from the previous year, increasing from 26% of total ODA to an unprecedented 39% of which aid to LDCs increased the most. Though this development is welcomed by NGOs – being one of civil society core recommendations for many years – the reasons and trends behind it need further scrutiny. The most significant increases benefit scholarships and humanitarian interventions and actions falling under the category of aid of persecuted Christians. These interventions were administered by the Deputy State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians in the Ministry of Human Capacities and not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), responsible for development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

This shift in priorities and in the institutional set-up was consolidated by a law adopted at the end of 2018, which reinstates the Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians under the Prime Minister’s Office and establishes the Hungary Helps Agency in charge of humanitarian aid and assistance provided to Christian communities abroad. The law thus splits the previous united policy and implementation framework and only leaves the MFAT to drive development cooperation without an implementing agency. The new framework raises many concerns around development effectiveness.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

In the coming years bilateral aid is expected to further increase. In 2019 big infrastructural projects have been launched in African countries, such as Uganda and Ghana, which will surely reshape the profile of Hungarian ODA in the next few years. The MFAT’s 2020 development budget has also been increased, though still not reaching the magnitude of the funds for humanitarian purposes and for helping Christian communities.

Meanwhile the MFAT has started the consultation process leading up to the adoption of the new Hungarian development strategy from 2020. The discussions are ongoing but it is clear that the government’s vision is very much inclined towards facilitating private sector involvement and strengthening economic relations rather than identifying actual goals for its desired development impact on the lives of people in partner countries. The adoption of an Africa strategy in April 2019, before an overall development strategy is put in place, highlights the fragmented actions and goals of the government. Even though the document has mainly an export focus, it has a strong development angle as well.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT

- Put ending poverty, fighting inequalities and improving the lives of people in partner countries at the centre of the new development strategy based on the principles of leaving no one behind, environmental sustainability, human rights, gender equality and development effectiveness.
- Besides humanitarian spending, increase bilateral ODA by devoting substantially more funds to development cooperation programmes.
- Ensure an equally well-equipped institutional background in development cooperation as in the humanitarian field.
- Improve transparency by publishing more detailed, comparable and forward-looking data on projects. Start reporting to IATI.
- Integrate divergent government policies and goals and create more adequate tools for ensuring policy coherence for sustainable development.

HUNGARY - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID

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<tr>
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</table>
Ireland has a long tradition of support for civil society. We know from our experience at home the valuable role civil society plays in shaping our social and economic development. Our new policy for international development, ‘A Better World’, recognises that partnerships with civil society should remain at the heart of Ireland’s work addressing global development and human rights challenges around the world.”

Simon Coveney, Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, May 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

Ireland’s spending on ODA peaked at 0.59% of GNI in 2008 and the following decade saw a downward trend in funding allocations. In 2018 ODA remained at 0.31% of GNI but the government did announce a substantial monetary increase of €110 million in the October budget. The Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and Tánaiste (Deputy Head of Government) have also repeatedly stated their renewed commitment to reaching the 0.7% target by 2030. Given the current buoyancy of the economy, the increase in ODA is unlikely to translate into a significant percentage rise. Yet Ireland’s spending on ODA in 2018 was 0.31% of GNI. However, its aid programme has maintained its integrity in how it spends its development budget, and has kept pace with the need for increased humanitarian spending, which stood at 24% of the overall ODA budget in 2017. Ireland has traditionally been a core donor to LDCs, now providing over 50% of its bilateral ODA to the group.

Ireland saw the launch of the government’s ‘Global Ireland 2025’ policy which envisages playing a role in “a greater Europe, in the United Nations, and the world at large” and will see Ireland double its global footprint by 2025. Irish Aid also began a substantive consultation to develop a new policy for international development, ‘A Better World’, which was officially launched in February 2019.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

At a time of enormous change globally, Irish Aid’s new international development policy, A Better World, commits to building on the quality of Ireland’s aid programme based on untied aid, focusing on LDCs, reiterating the aims to reach 0.7% ODA of GNI by 2030 and to enhance other core development effectiveness principles, including support to civil society. This is a very positive step and appears to have strong political support. However, it will be important to develop a clear implementation plan that is appropriately monitored. Irish Aid will undergo an OECD DAC Peer Review in 2019, which is timely to monitor this progress. In 2019, Ireland’s allocation to ODA is expected to be €817 million, which represents 0.39% of GNI. Due to the financial uncertainty surrounding Brexit, expectations are that ODA percentage will be maintained – notwithstanding a small monetary increase – at around 0.39% of GNI for 2019.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT

- Publish a roadmap with year-on-year increases to ensure 0.7% can be reached by 2025.
- Protect the poverty-focused definition of ODA, ensuring that ODA remains untied to trade and is not used for any other purpose than to alleviate poverty and promote respect for human rights, dignity and equality.
- Strengthen the enabling environment for CSOs, recognising that their role as both service providers and independent development actors remains critical to the success of Irish Aid’s new policy.
- Enhance policy coherence to deliver sustainable development outcomes, including setting realistic targets that will ensure the delivery of the SDGs and the A Better World policy.

I am committed to giving my best attention to Africa by further developing the dialogue with the regional leadership and by reasserting within the EU partners the key role that this continent can play on the global scene.”

Giuseppe Conte, Prime Minister’s inception speech, 9 September 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

Italian ODA in 2018 went back to its standard average performance after raising high expectations the year before. For 2017, the OECD DAC had reported volumes reaching 0.30% of GNI, which had actually been planned to be achieved a few years later (in 2020). But such a positive, unexpected record was largely inflated with in-donor refugee costs: when the number of refugees reaching Europe via Italy went down, Italian ODA dropped dramatically.

Nor was 2018 a good year from a governance angle either. The Director of the recently created national agency for development cooperation (AICS) resigned in March; it then took more than a year to fill that role on a permanent basis. Also, due to general elections in March 2018 and the political transition that followed, the National Council for Development Cooperation has been in recess since February 2018. It is notable that the multi-year planning document has not been officially endorsed in this vacuum.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

As for volumes in 2019, expectations must be restrained. Total commitments – officially endorsed with the budget session in December 2018 – are nominally very close to those for 2018, with a significant share of resources still under the Ministry of Interior for support to asylum seekers. With the number of refugees going down, it is fair to foresee the volumes will hardly recuperate ground lost.

In September 2019, a new government has just been sworn in thanks to a new political alliance that brings old foes together, the Five Star Movement and the Democratic Party, and that marginalises the most conservative political forces, the League and other far right groups for the time being. It is not unlikely that one of the fiercest campaigns waged against NGOs in Europe over the past few years may come to an end at last.

ITALY - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID

ITALY

0.18% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.23% TOTAL AID/GNI

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Italy should urgently reassert its role in realising the global aid commitments in line with its status in the EU, G7 and G20. In particular, the government and parliament should:

- Demonstrate their genuine commitment to international development by ensuring additional allocations to the aid budget, for instance by using the resources of the Ministry of Interior now earmarked for refugees, in line with the DAC regulations.
- Operationalise a new effectiveness plan for the comprehensive development cooperation system now being drafted, with the full participation of all national stakeholders; this is even more urgent in the case of lightly capitalised development cooperation policies.
- Revise the consultation mechanisms provided for with the sector legislation (L125/2014), which have been stalled due to political transition in 2018 and 2019.
- Fully support programmes by Italian NGOs by restore dedicated resources, which in 2019 have been slashed to less than €30 million (for three-year duration projects).
- Open up the Italian development cooperation system to partnerships with local actors.
It is essential for Latvia to share its experience and expertise, which has been positively assessed by our partner countries. The draft regulation [the EU’s external financial instrument] needs to incorporate principles and criteria that do not impede the ability of the small implementers to participate in the implementation of policies.”

Zanda Kalnina-Lukaševica, Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the informal meeting of EU development cooperation ministers, September 2018

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

In 2018 Latvian ODA decreased by 2.1% in real terms from 2017, which was mainly due to a drop in bilateral aid. In percentage of GNI, aid dropped from 2017 levels of 0.11% to 0.10%. This remains well below commitments to reach the 0.17% target by 2020 and the 0.33% target by 2030.

The overall amount of bilateral ODA decreased by over 10%, while bilateral aid funding managed by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) up slightly from 2017. The funding available through the open call for proposals remained at 2017 levels, while the proportion of funding for earmarked projects decreased. The share of scholarships and student costs from the bilateral aid managed by the MFA was also down, from 32% in 2017 to 25% in 2018.

Competition for CSOs’ access to funding continued to grow. In 2018 only 23% of the funding requested through the open call for proposals was granted. The MFA continued the practice started in 2016 of earmarking a minimum of 50% of funding available through open calls for proposals, to projects submitted by CSOs. As was noted by development CSOs, this has encouraged private sector organisations to establish non-profit set-ups to compete for the earmarked funding.

Cooperation between the MFA and civil society sector continued to improve in 2018, with joint participation in various events and consultations on bilateral ODA distribution practices. There were also improvements in cooperation and coordination among the project implementers. Project presentation sessions were well attended, indicating an increasing interest in development cooperation activities.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

While the Development Cooperation Policy Plan foresees the increase of ODA to 0.14% of GNI, it is unclear if this projection will be met. Overall bilateral aid managed by the MFA is expected to increase, but the amount of funding available through the open call for proposals by the MFA will remain the same as in 2018. Thus, the proportion of involvement of civil society actors in bilateral development assistance is expected to decrease in 2019. The priority areas and geographic allocation of aid will remain the same as in 2018, with a strong focus on Eastern Partnership countries and Central Asia.

In 2019, the new Development Cooperation Policy Guidelines 2021–2027 will be prepared, ready for drafting in 2020. The MFA will continue its work on improving ODA reporting practices, including increasing the capacity to adhere to OECD reporting guidelines. The MFA is also expected to review the financing procedures for the annual development cooperation grant competitions, simplifying them and making them more user-friendly.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT

• Urgently increase the funding for development cooperation to deliver on the 0.33% ODA/GNI commitment.
• Improve aid reporting practices to ensure more transparency in how ODA is delivered and to whom.
• Increase the portion of ODA directed towards LDCs to meet the international target.
• Increase the proportion of bilateral aid distributed through open calls for proposals.
• Continue to contribute to better coordination and improved quality of development cooperation practices of development actors in Latvia.
Lithuania has accumulated solid experience of development cooperation with Eastern Partnership countries. By sharing best practices and reform experiences, Lithuania is ready to contribute to the Africa–EU partnership.”

Linas Linkevičius, Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

In 2018, Lithuanian aid amounted to €49.63 million (current prices), a decrease of 6% from 2017. The ODA percentage of GNI hence dropped from 0.13% in 2017 to 0.11% in 2018, being mostly influenced by GNI growth.

The Inter-Institutional Action Plan on Development Cooperation, revised in 2017 for 2018 to 2020, commits to taking steps to guarantee that ODA meets the international commitment to reach the 0.33% GNI target by 2030. Lithuania prioritises six SDGs: end poverty, education, gender equality, climate change, peaceful and inclusive societies, and global partnerships. The main focus of Lithuanian bilateral aid is EU neighbouring countries and parties to the association agreements with the EU, with allocated spending of €1.4 million a year.

The Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion Programme – financed with special budget allocations earmarked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – funded €7.8 million in 2018. In 2018, the programme sponsored 84 bilateral, regional and awareness-raising development cooperation projects with €1.1 million, only 2.2% of total ODA.

In 2018, Lithuania become a full member of the OECD.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

In 2017 to 2020, the Central Project Management Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) are implementing Lithuanian development cooperation policy and produced the ‘Guidelines for Development Cooperation by the Public Sector Entities’. These advise public sector entities on how to prepare for and take part in development cooperation interventions and pave the way to a ‘one-agency’ approach. In this, coordination for all advisory and administrative financial management is provided by the Central Project Management Agency under the auspices of the MFA. A further initiative is the potential establishment of a Lithuanian Development Fund as a vehicle for implementing Lithuanian development cooperation policy in a more strategic, planned and focused manner. National NGOs are so far not being involved in the process.

The growing awareness of the potential of Lithuanian innovative solutions to contribute to the SDGs by designing electronic management systems and developing information technologies, as well as finance technologies and cyber security, has prompted the MFA to assist companies to become more familiar with the fast-growing financial technology sector in Africa. From the MFA’s perspective, bilateral support for development cooperation can meanwhile pave the way for mutually beneficial exchanges with African countries around civil society, culture, tourism, investment and trade.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT

• Engage in consultations with civil society at national level on the planning and development of the ‘one-agency’ approach and a Lithuanian Development Fund.
• Report refugee costs and scholarships in Lithuania separately from aid flows.
• Raise the level of funding for development and global education to 2% of aid flows, in partnership with the Ministry of Education.
• Develop an action plan on policy coherence for development, empowering the National Commission for Development Cooperation and engaging NGOs, companies and other partners in development cooperation activities.
• Publish an annual report on the implementation of the Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion Programme including information from other public entities and NGOs.

LITHUANIA - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID

(€ million, constant 2017)
CONCORD AidWatch 2019 - Leaving no one behind: Time for implementation

As set in the government programme, we remain committed to continuing each year to invest 1% of gross national income in projects to help our neighbours in less privileged countries.”

Paulette Lenert, Minister for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Affairs, speech to the Chamber of Deputies, May 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

Luxemburgish ODA in 2018 amounted to €401 million (current prices) and 0.98% of GNI. The allocation between sectors remained practically unchanged; however, a slight variation in the geographic allocation in favour of LDCs can be noted. Six of the ten largest aid recipient countries are LDCs, compared with five in 2017. The amount of bilateral ODA going to LDCs increased from 46.16% in 2017 to 51.22% in 2018.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

In 2018, the new development strategy ‘The Road to 2030’ was developed and adopted by the government. NGOs in Luxembourg were supportive of this new strategy with four main thematic priorities: improving access to quality basic social services, enhancing socioeconomic integration of women and youth, promoting inclusive and sustainable growth, and strengthening inclusive governance. However, NGOs have raised concerns about the objective of the Luxemburgish government to involve more private sector players. As stated in the strategy, to “leverage (Luxembourg’s) comparative advantage as a leading international financial centre and in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector by promoting enhanced engagement with new partners, particularly the private sector, and by applying innovative financing mechanisms as well as technological and scientific instruments for development”. The implication for the private sector has not been defined and there are no clear guidelines on accountability and impact assessment.

The leave no one behind principle is mentioned several times in this new strategy as an important landmark for programming and one of the four main pillars is ‘enhancing socioeconomic integration of women and youth’. The great challenge for Luxemburgish development cooperation will be to develop a purposeful instrument for implementing, reporting and following up on this commitment.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LUXEMBOURGISH GOVERNMENT

- Use your role as best performer on the quantity and quality of aid to advocate for other EU member states to reach the 0.7% target and report genuine ODA.
- Maintain a regular dialogue with all stakeholders around the implementation of the new strategy.
- Specify an overall strategy for collaboration with the private sector that provides sufficient levels of transparency and accountability.
- Develop a methodology to monitor the realisation of the leave no one behind pledge. Pay attention to increasing the disaggregation of development data, reinforcing the focus on left-behind groups in monitoring and evaluation systems and increasing support for projects that include marginalised groups.
Malta has registered progress in a good number of sustainable development targets. Data published in the 2019 SDG Index and Dashboards Report places Malta in 28th place, out of 162 countries reviewed. This is a recognition of our collective actions in the drive to mainstream sustainability. While acknowledging the progress made, we do believe that there is a continued need for improvement across all sectors.

Neville Aquilina, Director General for Global Issues, International Development and Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Promotion, September 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

The Maltese Government has not yet published its ODA report for 2018, making it challenging for civil society to assess Malta’s performance in international development cooperation.

Malta is reporting 0.26% of ODA/GNI for 2018,1 an increase from 0.21% in 2017. In real terms, this is an increase of €5.2 million (from €23 million in 2017 to €28.2 million for 2018). It is almost equally distributed, as bilateral assistance increased by €2.85 million while multilateral assistance increased by €2.36 million.

It is encouraging that the increase in ODA as a percentage of GNI in 2018 was attained notwithstanding the substantial increase in GNI in 2017. In total terms, this is the second consecutive year with an increase of €5 million on the previous year.

The triplication of spending on student costs (from €2 million in 2017 to €6.37 million in 2018) can be read as a positive trend in terms of offering new opportunities to students from developing countries. However, most of these funds end up being spent in Malta, pointing towards an increase in the inflated aid ratio in Malta’s ODA.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Promotion’s decision to have a more focused development cooperation approach by prioritising certain geographic areas for its ODA is shared by civil society. However, there should be space for a more nuanced approach for the CSOs that have built experience in other regions and to explore new areas of engagement for which Maltese expertise may be relevant. For example, focusing on small island developing states – Malta could take a leading role given its geography and expertise. More generally, Malta’s intentions to potentially link ODA to its political priorities for promoting trade in certain regions of Africa could turn out to be controversial and troublesome.

1 According to government figures, this percentage is 0.25% of GNI.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MALTESE GOVERNMENT

• Increase the amount and proportion of genuine aid to meet the objectives set at EU level and make refugee costs additional to the ODA levels previously committed to.
• Increase the transparency of ODA reporting by publishing an in-depth and comprehensive report on Malta’s overall ODA spending.
• Improve aid effectiveness by increasing the funds to high-quality poverty eradication projects proposed by Maltese CSOs, raising awareness of the development impact of Maltese CSOs, and introducing a co-financing mechanism for larger grants (EC-funded development education and awareness-raising projects).
• Support CSOs in increasing their capacity to implement and monitor projects fully focused on the leave no one behind principles.
• Engage with Maltese civil society and development experts in assessing the Maltese ODA programme and policy, evaluating its geographical and thematic focus and its effectiveness among other things.
In order to be able to contribute as much as possible to the SDGs, steps must be taken that fit within the reconfirmation of the international agreement at EU and UN level to work towards an ODA budget of 0.7 percent of GNI in 2030.”

Sigrid Kaag, Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Policy Brief ‘Invest in perspective’, 2018

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

In 2018, the Dutch government increased its ODA budget by €1.75 billion. This was mainly used to fill the gaps created by the previous government to cover refugee costs and other migration-related spending in 2015 and 2016. However, the expected yearly cut of €1.4 billion (which is deducted from the 0.7% target of GNI), initiated by the previous government, stays in place.

The 2018 policy brief ‘Invest in perspective’ places the SDGs at the centre of Dutch development policy. The government also launched the development of an SDG check, which should help to take the interests of developing countries into account in the initial stages of formulating new policy, legislation and regulations.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

In 2019 the SDG check has been implemented in the Integrated Assessment Framework that is used for all new policies and legislation. This is expected to increase Dutch policies’ coherence for development.

The new policy framework for strengthening civil society in developing countries is also expected to be published in 2019. This framework should lead to new partnerships with CSOs in the field of advocacy and influence, starting in 2021.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT

- Make the Netherlands an international champion in the fight against shrinking civic space.
- Present a concrete step-by-step plan to return to the delivery of the 0.7% aid target by 2025.
- Make sure that neither Dutch nor EU Aid are used for border control.
- Introduce a ceiling for covering asylum costs with the ODA budget.
- Ensure that trade-related activities are in line with inclusive, sustainable development.
Currently, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs we are working on a new Multiannual Program of Development Cooperation for the years 2021–2030. The program will define our priorities – both geographic and thematic. Our aim is to create a partnership of stakeholders engaged in development cooperation – among them we see the private sector as a prominent one.”

Marcin Przydacz, Undersecretary of State for Eastern Policy, Economic Diplomacy and Development, September 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

Total Polish ODA in 2018 was €646 million (current prices), showing no change in the percentage of GNI, stable at 0.13%.

Only 5 of 12 priority countries listed in Poland’s 2016–2020 development cooperation strategy were among the largest 10 recipient countries in 2018. A significant share of bilateral ODA went to humanitarian aid programmes (mainly for Syria and Syrian displaced people), representing a continuation of efforts in this area seen in 2016 and 2017.

The share of bilateral ODA addressed to LDCs was around 30% in 2018, compared with 6.4% in 2017. The increase is due to the disbursement of tied aid credits for Tanzania (€22 million) and Myanmar (€49.1 million). Only €22 million was channelled through NGOs, which is around 10% of bilateral ODA. Poland reported about €3.8 million in refugee costs as ODA (0.6% of total ODA).

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

In accordance with Poland’s international commitments, its aid volume should reach 0.33% of GNI by 2030. The Polish aid budget has been slowly growing in the last 10 years, up from 0.08% of GNI in 2010 to 0.15% in 2018. According to the 2019 Annual Development Cooperation Plan, Polish aid will increase significantly in 2019 from €0.64 to €0.79 billion (around 20%).

The increases necessary to meet the ODA commitment seem unlikely to be met. Indeed, spending on Polish development cooperation should increase to almost €3 billion by 2030, which means a systematic annual growth of total Polish ODA of about €197 million.

Poland has started work on a new multiannual development cooperation programme (2021–2030), under which a development agency (and national development bank) is being considered as a long-term goal. Such a step is connected to the need to increase funds for ODA, especially bilateral ODA. Consultation on this new strategy is ongoing.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT

- Present an operational plan for increasing the level of ODA to 0.33% of GNI by 2030.
- Prepare the new multi-year strategy in line with the 2017 DAC OECD recommendations stated in Poland’s 2017 peer review.
- Include core support and capacity building for NGOs and other social partners in a comprehensive cooperation programme for civil society development.
- Make sure the strategy for engaging with the private sector in Polish development cooperation 1) ensures social and environmental responsibility of Polish companies operating in partner countries and 2) pays special attention to private sector support in partner countries, including micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as social economy entities.
- Strengthen the role of the Development Cooperation Policy Council to enable this body to fulfil its mandate.
- Involve the new Parliament elected in October 2019 more fully in monitoring the implementation of development cooperation policies and – through its Foreign Affairs Committee – engage in strategic planning of Polish development cooperation.
The new agenda is based on inviting the private sector in order to make up for the enormous gap between the amount of disbursed ODA and the financial flows that are needed to fulfil the SDGs.”

Teresa Ribeiro, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, January 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

According to official data provided by Camões IP, the Portuguese Development Cooperation Agency, ODA decreased from 0.18% GNI in 2017 to 0.17% in 2018. As stated by the OECD DAC, this was due to a decline in contributions to multilateral organisations (which had been exceptionally high in 2017). The increase in funding to ODA since 2015 was far from matching Gross National Product’s 2% growth rate a year. Yet, the picture looks even worse now, as ODA levels decreased for the first time in four years, to just €320 million. On the other hand, Camões IP reinforced its role as implementing agent with an increase of 65% in funding from EU programmes.

A trend of untying aid was consolidated in 2018 – while in 2012 tied aid rose above 75%, it is now below 26% (still higher than the OECD DAC average).

The National Strategy for Development Education for 2018–2022 and its Action Plan were approved with contributions from CSOs. The new strategy was built on the successes of the first strategy (2010–2016) by allowing official authorities and civil society to work together. In 2018, funding for development education reached €840,000.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

The government’s trend of creating financial mechanisms for leveraging private investment from Portuguese companies will be confirmed in 2019. To do that bilateral agreements are being signed with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa under the Lusophone Compact. This is a major concern for the Portuguese economy’s focus on internationalisation rather than investing in local economic actors’ development. Even if it makes funding conditional on sustainability criteria, it can divert ODA from its solidarity nature aimed at ending poverty.

Humanitarian aid seems to have become one of the government’s priorities, as shown in 2018 by the opening of a call for proposals for non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs) by Camões IP for projects related to humanitarian aid. In 2019, the Portuguese government also created a new reconstruction fund for Mozambique after the cyclones, gathering funding from the private sector. This trend is however not consistent with any existing strategic framework, something which the Portuguese NGDO Platform has long been advocating for.

In 2019, the trend for prioritising delegated cooperation projects and trust funds will most likely continue, making it more difficult for civil society to play a role in defining political priorities, as Camões IP takes the role of implementing agent even further as one of its main features.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT

• Establish a trajectory to increase ODA aimed at reaching the 0.7% GNI target by 2030, while respecting the aid effectiveness principles.
• Prioritise state funds to ODA regardless of the importance of the EU’s delegated cooperation.
• Release detailed information on the implementation of programmes, particularly around delegated cooperation and private sector financial instruments.
• Condition funding for the private sector’s involvement in development through a focus on sustainability, respect for human rights and environmental protection.
• Include all development actors in discussions about strategic options for Portuguese cooperation. Regularly consult CSOs on all aspects, ensuring they are able to participate effectively.

PORTUGAL - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID
(€ million, constant 2016)
Romania aims to enhance the dialogue with NGOs and academia and support their capacity to implement development projects in partner countries."

Strategic Multiannual Programme on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance Policy, 2018–2021

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

According to preliminary data provided by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2018 Romania’s total ODA amounted to €211 million (current prices), representing an increase of around 10% from 2017. The ODA/GNI ratio has remained constant since 2017 at 0.11%. In April 2018, Romania upgraded its status in the OECD DAC to participant, reflecting a growing interest in becoming more active in this forum.

At national level, Romania’s International Development Cooperation Agency (RoAid) became fully operational in early 2018 under the coordination of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite the inclusion of CSO projects in the approved Annual Action Plan for 2018, the funding was not disbursed (no formal explanation was given). Two calls for proposals for projects implemented by the Romanian private sector were organised in 2018, but none for CSOs, reflecting the current trend in restricting civil society space in Romania.

The Romanian Government presented its first National Voluntary Review during the UN High-Level Political Forum in July 2018. The national delegation included a representative of the Romanian NGDO Platform (FOND), who gave a brief intervention on the importance of engaging civil society in the implementation and monitoring process of the 2030 Agenda. In December 2018, the Department for Sustainable Development (under the Prime Minister’s Office) launched the new National Sustainable Development Strategy, which defines the national framework and a roadmap with priorities for implementing the 2030 Agenda. The strategy also includes consultation mechanisms with civil society and other relevant stakeholders.

Romania does not have yet a specific strategy on implementing the leave no one behind principle in the context of development cooperation. In 2018, Romania provided scholarships and financial aid to students from 20 LDCs and 10 fragile states, besides its annual contributions to the core funds of international organisations such as the UN, International Organization for Migration and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

The Romanian Presidency of the EU Council (during the first semester of 2019) included among its priorities the commitment to continue the EU’s efforts to implement the SDGs, the 2030 Agenda and the new European Consensus on Development, with a focus on youth.

At the national level, the Action Plan of the National Sustainable Development Strategy 2030 will be elaborated and consultation mechanisms put in place, where CSOs can participate (such as an Advisory Council on Sustainable Development and a Coalition for Sustainable Development). The Annual Action Plan for 2019 implemented by RoAid will continue to focus on supporting exclusively private sector initiatives in partner countries with a total amount of €1.03 million.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT

- Support the creation of a parliamentary commission on development cooperation.
- Resume the participation of CSO representatives in all the consultation mechanisms and at all institutional levels around international development cooperation and humanitarian aid.
- Resume the call for proposals targeting CSO projects in partner countries and awareness raising on global issues.
- Initiate a consultation with relevant national stakeholders (including CSOs) to elaborate the 2020 ODA Annual Action Plan.
- Allocate adequate funding for implementing the development cooperation strategic framework and the 2030 Agenda, according to development effectiveness principles and international commitments.
- Ensure the monitoring and implementation of policy coherence for sustainable development in the framework of the 2030 Agenda and engage all relevant stakeholders in this process, including CSOs.
China is more active, and other large nations will be more active as well – and I think we must not be left behind because... if the European Union does not help Africa to develop well and help the people to live a dignified life in Africa, in a few years’ time, the Union will have a serious problem.”

Peter Pellegrini, Prime Minister, December 2018

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

The unprecedented murder of Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, who had written extensively on the links between organised crime and Slovak politicians, marked 2018. The largest mass protests and demonstrations since the 1989 velvet revolution led to the demise of the prime minister and his cabinet. Since, CSOs have been blamed and attacked in the media – by right-wing extremists but also by the ruling parties – for trying to overthrow the government and interfere with Slovak politics. This has negatively impacted public perception of CSOs, including their work in development cooperation.

With its 0.13% of investments in ODA/GNI, Slovakia placed last in the OECD DAC donor list and is behind on implementing the 2030 Agenda. However, the increase in ODA from €99.5 million in 2017 to €117.6 million in 2018 is positive. Yet no LDCs are among the largest 10 recipients of Slovak ODA in 2018.

The ratio between bilateral and multilateral aid further dropped from 26.07% in 2017 to 24.04% in 2018. Bilateral aid includes the so-called bi-multi aid channelled to international organisations. This has reduced Slovak NGOs and private companies’ access to resources, as they can only apply for around 5% of ODA.

In 2018, Slovakia went through the OECD DAC Peer Review which included recommendations to identify its comparative advantage, increase focus due to its limited capacity, increase budget, develop a monitoring and evaluation system, and promote results-based management.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

The mid-term strategy on ODA for 2019–2023 begins in 2019. In plan are a country strategy paper, a strategy on humanitarian aid, changes to the act on Slovak development cooperation, and putting into practice the DAC recommendations. Further fragmentation of the ODA system is expected unless the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) resumes its official and legitimate role of ODA coordinator. Slovakia focuses on 24 recipient countries plus others under the Ministry of Finance. This is a stretch given its limited budget, the number of embassies and Slovakian expertise.

The long-awaited Vision and National Development Strategy until 2030 should start in 2019 as part of efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SLOVAKIAN GOVERNMENT

• Focus aid towards certain sectors, geographies and achieving results.
• Redistribute the highly disproportionate ratio between bilateral and multilateral aid so that bilateral reaches 35% of ODA; ensure NGOs and companies can apply for amounts of €10 million.
• Build up capacity of the MFA over the long term, including embassies and field staff, by focusing on bilateral aid, while maintaining international commitments.
• Renew Slovakia’s commitment to meeting the 0.33% ODA/ GNI target by 2030.
• Set up a system of knowledge management and programme evaluations.
• Identify a policy on leave no one behind and include LDC countries in the Slovakian development cooperation budget and strategy.
• Pilot the strategic partnership instrument to increase the effectiveness and impact of SlovakAid projects.
• Rethink and improve the strategy and instruments for business engagement, provide safeguarding measures and refrain from mixing up business engagement in development cooperation with foreign trade and exports.
• Mainstream policy coherence for sustainable development in programmes, including investments and foreign trade, and develop a system for implementation.
• Connect the new strategy on Slovak foreign policy expected in 2020 more with ODA.
As part of the developed world, Slovenia has a responsibility for steady global development and, as a developed country, has the responsibility to contribute, through financial resources and projects, to a better, more balanced and sustainable development in countries less developed than us.”

Uroš Vajgl, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

Slovenian ODA amounted to €70.8 million in 2018 (current prices), which represents an increase of 5% from 2017. In terms of share of GNI, however, Slovenia’s ODA has been stagnating at 0.16%, half-way to reaching its commitment to provide 0.33% of its GNI for ODA by 2030. Multilateral aid continues to represent the biggest share of ODA in 2018, and a new strategy, adopted in 2018, announced an increase in bilateral ODA. Slovenia continues to increase imputed student costs and scholarships, amounting to around 40% of its bilateral ODA, but is not sufficiently monitoring the contribution of these students to their countries of origin. Refugee costs are increasing as well, reaching €2.07 million – 2.9% of Slovenian ODA. No positive changes to the trends of linking domestic security and economic interests to ODA were made in 2018. Civil society fears that ODA might lose its intended meaning and that such projects might be overriding the principles of aid effectiveness. And while the Slovenian government is slowly getting familiar with the concept of tied aid, its reports reveal some level of confusion remains.

On the positive side, reported total ODA that has gender equality as either principal or significant objective noticeably increased. This can be attributed to the changes made to the project planning and reporting forms to include gender-disaggregated data, with guidelines for mainstreaming gender equality implemented in the work of ministries.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

In February 2019 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) prepared a draft action plan for gradually increasing ODA. Although it was expected to be adopted before summer, there has been no progress since its presentation to the Expert Council for International Development Cooperation. The plan includes government projections for 2019 and beyond, revealing that it has not yet prepared any plan confirming that reaching 0.33% by 2030 is a realistic option. These projections are so far not echoed by the MFA in any known official or adopted documents. CSOs fear that due to the lack of political will the action plan will not be adopted, which will continue to make it difficult for them to monitor the government’s progress on the commitment.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SLOVENIAN GOVERNMENT

• Increase ODA to meet the 0.33% target and the 0.2% target to LDCs. Ensure adequate organisational structure of governmental bodies for ODA implementation. Focus programmes primarily on reducing poverty and upholding human rights, particularly in LDCs.

• Extend bilateral ODA to become at least half of total ODA, increasing the share of priority-targeted and monitored aid, and strengthen the financial support to development projects of NGOs in development cooperation, development education and humanitarian aid.

• Develop mechanisms for monitoring the brain drain concerns directly connected with raising imputed student costs from ODA recipient countries and ensure continuous cooperation with foreign-supported students to extend their contribution to their countries’ development.

• Prepare clear guidelines and safeguards for the inclusion of private sector, strengthen the respect of human rights in all partner countries, and ensure adequate financial resources for strengthening cross-sectoral and multi-stakeholder partnerships.

• Ensure greater transparency in the case of blending flows, including by reporting them separately in the annual ODA report. Reconsider the use of blended finance taking into account the risks of using public money to cover private risks and efficacy of projects.
Let’s act now because the earth is bleeding. Let’s act now because people’s problems cannot wait. Let us act now because the challenges of this millennium go beyond the limits and capacities of our nation-states.”

Acting President Pedro Sánchez, UN General Assembly, 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

The Socialist government ended its mandate after only eight months, as it did not have enough support to approve the 2019 budget. Political instability postponed progress on development cooperation, sustainability and social issues. The good declarations made at the start of President Sánchez’s mandate, focusing on development cooperation policy recovery and 2030 Agenda implementation, were outshined by the incapacity to increase the extraordinary low ODA budget — under 0.2% during the last seven years.

In 2018, ODA shrank from 0.19% to 0.18% (€2.27 billion to €2.18 billion) and Spain is in penultimate position in the Quality of ODA Index. CSOs’ cooperation resources stagnated and focused on their role as implementers, especially attending to refugees’ needs in Spain. On aid effectiveness, Spain has not met the LDCs aid target, underinvests in humanitarian aid, development education and awareness raising, and continues to inflate and tie its aid. The government completed a high-level architecture for implementing the 2030 Agenda, pushed European commitments in the sense of a more explicit implementation process and backed the UN Secretary General’s call for accelerating key initiatives. However, domestically it could not deliver a sustainable development strategy.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

Because of political and budgetary impasse, the main changes proposed in the 2019 Annual Cooperation Plan were not made. In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Pedro Sánchez conveyed strong commitment to the SDGs and climate action, concretised with commitments of €150 million to the Green Climate Fund, €100 million to the Joint SDG Fund and €100 million to the Global Fund. Even if UN multilateralism needs to be defended, Spain needs to complete a robust and policy change-focused 2030 Agenda framework. Without this, it will hardly be a credible partner in the multilateral arena.

With elections in November 2019, Spain is still struggling with the social consequences of the recession and lacks reforms for energy and ecological transition, education quality, gender equality, fiscal policy and democracy deepening. And it will be a challenge to recover and prioritise a development cooperation policy reform. A positive step comes from citizens’ mobilisation, however, for example through strikes to support gender equality and climate change action.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT

- Set up a credible roadmap of reforms, resources and capacities to ensure development cooperation policy focuses on gender, human rights, sustainability and enabling civic space.
- Establish a concrete and credible roadmap for achieving the 0.5% ODA/GNI target in 2023 – as a step to reach 0.7% in the long term – prioritising instruments that reinforce effectiveness and quality.
- Ensure that fighting poverty and inequality and upholding human rights remain the primary focus of development cooperation. Make sure any aid instrument focused on migration management or private sector involvement is consistent with this objective.
- Resume negotiations on the new CSO strategic framework, considering the diverse roles of civil society, including by creating new financing instruments that reflect these.
- Deliver an overarching sustainable development strategy and take practical steps to make progress on the policy coherence for sustainable development mechanism in the 2030 Agenda framework. A stronger framework requires considering systemic challenges such as business compliance in human rights, gender equality, climate justice action, civic space and democracy, and stronger social and environmental requirements in trade agreements.

### SPAIN - GENUINE AND INFLATED AID

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<th>Genuine bilateral aid</th>
<th>Refugees in donor countries</th>
<th>Student costs</th>
<th>Debt relief</th>
<th>Interest relief</th>
<th>Tied aid</th>
<th>Gap to 0.7% of GNI</th>
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1 Centre for Global Development, Quality of ODA (QuODA), www.cgdev.org/page/quality-oda-quoda
International aid must develop as the world changes, and today’s big issues have to do with democracy and the rule of law. Will nationalism win, or will human rights and democracy? We will continue to develop our work on democracy, not least in Europe. I will put forward proposals for how to focus our policy even more on democracy. There will also be more focus on climate and environment, where the issue now is not just about transition but also about adapting to a much harsher reality in many places.”

Peter Eriksson, Minister for International Development Cooperation, January 2019

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

The first half of 2018 was characterised by the campaign ahead of Sweden’s general election. International development was not high on the political agenda, and apart from climate change and migration, few global issues were debated.

After the election there were protracted negotiations to form a government. For four months, the previous government remained as interim, without formulating new policies. This affected the development cooperation budget, which was adopted without specific allocations to different sectors, regions or themes. Policy development temporarily stalled, making it a slow period for policy initiatives around, for example, the Feminist Foreign Policy, the 2030 Agenda action plan and policy coherence for sustainable development.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

With the new year, a government was formed by the Social Democrats and the Green Party. This was made possible by a 73-point budget agreement between the government, the Centre Party and the Liberals. This includes development cooperation (confirmation of the 1% ODA/GNI target and more focus on democracy support). A ‘drive for democracy’ has since been announced by the government.

In the adjusted budget, the government increased in-donor refugee costs reported as ODA by 700 million Swedish Krona (around €70 million), leading to that amount being deducted from the development cooperation budget. As previously, transparency on in-donor costs was lacking. According to media comments from the Minister for International Development Cooperation, a new calculation model for in-donor refugee costs was agreed by February. This was not made public, and instead more money than anticipated was taken from development cooperation. Some information was published in the budget proposal in September 2019, but still without enough transparency to verify the amount counted as ODA.

In May 2019, the OECD DAC published a positive peer review of Sweden, applauding its consistently generous ODA levels, effective development cooperation, leadership on peace and conflict prevention, environmental sustainability and gender equality, and strong focus on leaving no one behind. More critical recommendations included improving synergies between its wide variety of strategies (country, regional and thematic), using country budgets and systems more, ensuring adequate staffing, and continuing to develop its work on the nexus of conflict, humanitarian and long-term development support.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT

- Continue to fulfil the target of 1% ODA/GNI and promote conversation on development cooperation focused on relevance and choice of strategies to prevent superficial debates on cutting ODA levels.
- Commit to phasing out in-donor refugee costs from ODA in the long term, and while still counted as ODA, urgently publish the full details of the calculation model for improved transparency and accountability, and reconsider the recent decision to add new types of in-donor costs to ODA.
- Develop plans for the ‘drive for democracy’ in Swedish development cooperation through an inclusive process with local and Swedish CSOs and other actors for democracy.
- Maintain a strong human rights and poverty eradication perspective in negotiations on ODA in the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework. Resist political proposals attempting to use ODA to implement EU migration and security policies.

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Global Britain wants mutual prosperity; based on British values. And I want to use our development programmes to help build the foundation of a more inclusive global economy.”

Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt, Secretary of State for International Development, October 2018

MAIN CHANGES IN 2018

In 2018, the UK continued to meet the 0.7% ODA/GNI target, as in previous years, maintaining its position as one of the largest bilateral donors in the world. It continued to spend most of its aid budget (over 55%) through multilateral channels (including multilateral core contributions and bilateral spending through multilateral institutions), with the World Bank Group being the single largest multilateral aid recipient. The UK also increased its contributions to CDC Group, its development finance institution, with contributions doubling from the previous year to over 5% of total aid spending.

The increase in funds to CDC Group signifies the continued commitment by the UK Government to prioritise promoting private investment flows and private sector development. In 2018, this has continued to attract criticism from stakeholders who suggest this approach is diluting real efforts to reduce poverty and reach the people most in need by reducing the focus of ODA on areas such as education and health.

Alongside the government’s push to increase the importance of trade and investment promotion in UK aid is the continued commitment, originally introduced in the 2015 Aid Strategy, to spend more of UK ODA outside the Department for International Development (DFID), primarily through other departments such as the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and new joint funds (the Prosperity Fund and the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund). This has also led to an increasing percentage of UK ODA being spent in lower and upper middle-income countries.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2019 AND BEYOND

The UK is projected to meet its commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on overseas aid in 2019 (a target enshrined in law), however the uncertainty surrounding the UK’s potential exit from the EU and related ongoing political instability (including the prospect of a national election) means that the longer-term policy priorities for UK aid are unclear. The level of political instability in the UK throughout 2018 and carrying into 2019 is also affecting the ability to predict and harness the support of parliamentary champions who support poverty-focused, untied aid.

In the short term the UK’s aid budget is likely to continue to be spent pursuing the strategy of ‘mutual prosperity’, with a substantial proportion being spent by departments other than DFID. By 2020, the objective remains that 30% of all UK ODA will be spent by these departments. The UK Government has committed that by 2020 all UK ODA spend (regardless of which department spends it) will be ranked as either ‘good’ or ‘very good’ on the Aid Transparency Index.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UK GOVERNMENT

- Continue to honour the commitment to spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA. Make sure all aid spent is in line with the International Development Act, OECD aid rules and the development effectiveness agenda, with a clear focus on tackling poverty.
- Ensure all UK aid reduces poverty and inequality, and supports the SDGs, in line with the International Development Acts, making sure resources are targeted towards the people and places that need them most.
- Remain committed to collective action on the global stage, and maintain and strengthen the commitment to OECD DAC rules on aid spending, to prevent any misuse of aid money.
HOW THE COMPONENTS OF INFLATED AID ARE CALCULATED

Under the OECD DAC’s official definition of aid, donors can report a number of financial flows that, in the view of CONCORD AidWatch, do not genuinely contribute to the objectives of development cooperation. To give a more accurate picture of donors’ efforts to reduce poverty and inequality, the AidWatch methodology discounts the following items from net ODA flows (for more information, see the relevant sections that follow):

- spending on students in the donor country;
- spending on refugees in the donor country;
- interest repayments on concessional loans, which should instead be considered a ‘negative’ budget item;
- debt relief and future interest on cancelled debts;
- the additional cost of tied aid, in this report estimated at 15% of partially tied aid and 30% of tied aid.

The rationale for discounting these items is based on two principles: an assessment of whether or not they contribute to development, based on the aid effectiveness principles, and whether or not they represent a genuine transfer of resources to developing countries. Measuring aid inflation in relation to an overall aid budget, however, tends to minimise the real extent of the problem. The level of aid inflation is best perceived as a share of the bilateral aid budget, because it is only possible to estimate it in relation to the expenses managed directly by donors. Consequently, ‘genuine aid’ is the sum of all multilateral aid and ‘genuine bilateral aid’ (meaning bilateral ODA disbursements, in constant 2017 prices, minus the already mentioned inflated aid items).

IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS

Imputed student costs include the costs of tuition less any fees paid by the students, and are calculated as a percentage of public expenditure on higher education, weighted by the number of foreign students.1 In theory, only the cases in which foreign affairs ministries or aid agencies are involved should be counted towards student costs, but the methodology for estimating these costs is not well defined by the OECD.2 Reporting practices also seem to differ by country, especially when it comes to the level of involvement of aid authorities and the types of costs that are eligible.

Debt relief and future interest on cancelled debts

As data on imputed student costs in 2018 was not available at the time of writing, the figures used in this report are based on projections calculated with the official data available for 2014–2017 – except when national platforms were able to access updated data. For more details on how the projections were calculated, see the ‘Quantitative data’ section.

REFUGEE COSTS

According to OECD DAC rules, resources spent on supporting refugees arriving in the donor country are eligible as ODA for the first 12 months of their stay. Eligible expenditure includes payments for refugees’ transport to the host country, temporary sustenance (food, shelter and training) and some of the costs of resettlement.3 In CONCORD’s view, while it is vital for countries to support refugees arriving at their borders, labelling these kinds of expenditure as ODA is misleading, given that they provide no resources for developing countries and are not linked to the core purpose of ODA – which is to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.4 In addition, donors show considerable differences in their reporting practices. To obtain the genuine aid figure, therefore, in-donor refugee costs must be removed from net ODA flows.

New reporting standards for in-donor refugee costs were clarified by the DAC at the High Level Meeting in October 2017.5 The guidelines reinstate the eligibility rule of covering only the first 12 months of stay; they also clarify eligible categories of refugees and cost items. However, the outcome of this review process did not address CSOs’ demand for donors to phase out entirely the reporting of in-donor refugee costs as ODA.

DEBT RELIEF AND FUTURE INTEREST ON CANCELLED DEBTS

When donors cancel or reschedule bilateral debts, the amount cancelled can be reported as aid in the year the debt is restructured.6 The cancellation of unpayable debts is important, but it should not be counted as aid. In the first place, in their cancellation donors can count both the principal and future interest; and since many of the debts are long term, counting future interest can inflate the figure significantly. Secondly, the relationship between the debt and development objectives is often unclear. Research conducted by Eurodad shows that 85% of the bilateral debts cancelled between 2005 and 2009 were

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1 The CRS DAC line used in this report for student costs is I.A.5.2.
3 The CRS DAC line used in this report for in-donor refugee costs is I.A.8.2.
4 CSOs with the support of CONCORD Europe, CSO recommendations on the clarification of DAC reporting rules for ODA to in-donor refugee costs, 2017, www.oecd.org/dac/CSO_recommendations_to_the_DAC_on_IDRC_May_2017.pdf
6 The CRS DAC line used in this report for debt relief is I.A.6.
debts resulting from export credit guarantees. The mandate of export credit agencies is to support national (donor-country) companies by encouraging international exports – not to support development. Moreover, donor countries often lend irresponsibly, and can contribute to increasing the debt of developing countries. The Norwegian government, for example, admitted its co-responsibility for the debt generated by export credits extended to five developing countries, and cancelled that debt in 2006.8

TIED AID9

The problem with tied aid is that making aid conditional on the purchase of goods and services from one donor country, or a restricted set of countries, reduces its development impact. Firstly, this is because it increases the cost of purchasing goods and services (by between 15–30%), undermining affordability for poor countries.10 It acts as an expensive subsidy for donor-country industries. And secondly, because it may actually increase the net resource flow from developing to donor countries. By preventing developing countries from procuring local goods and services, it undermines local job generation and economic development. To reflect the financial impact of tying, the CONCORD AidWatch methodology discounts 30% of the flows that are recorded as fully tied and 15% of the flows that are partially tied.

As data on tied aid in 2018 was not available at the time of writing, the figures used in this report are based on projections calculated with the official data available for 2014 to 2017. For more details on how the projections were calculated, see the ‘Quantitative data’ section.

INTEREST PAYMENTS ON CONCESSIONAL LOANS

When donors estimate their net ODA, they discount the repayment of the principal by recipient governments, but not interest payments, which are counted as aid.11 CONCORD AidWatch counts these interest payments as inflated aid. The recent decisions by the OECD DAC mean that as of 2018 loans are reported in a different fashion – see Box 4. These changes were made after it was noted that France, Germany and the European Investment Bank had extended over US$2.5 billion (€1.8 billion) in ‘concessional’ loans to developing countries at interest payments, which are counted as aid.11 CONCORD AidWatch counts these interest payments as inflated aid. The recent decisions by the OECD DAC mean that as of 2018 loans are reported in a different fashion – see Box 4. These changes were made after it was noted that France, Germany and the European Investment Bank had extended over US$2.5 billion (€1.8 billion) in ‘concessional’ loans to developing countries at interest rates above their own borrowing costs.12

As data for 2018 on interest repayments was not available at the time of writing, the figures used in this report are based on projections calculated with the official data available for 2014 to 2017 – except when national platforms were able to access updated data. For more details on how the projections were calculated, see the ‘Quantitative Data’ section.

BLENDING

In the cases of Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden, ODA for blending is based on the figures reported by the national platforms in the AidWatch questionnaire. Data for the EU has been extracted from the Dashboard database13 and represent transfers into the existing blending facilities. ODA for blending as a share of total ODA flows was estimated using the figures of total ODA reported in the AidWatch report.

LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND

Box 7 leave no one behind index fo EU Member States and Institutions and Member States’ performance on leaving no one behind is based on information that national platforms have gathered through interviews with their governments and desk research as well as interviews with European Commission officials in DG International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO).

For question 1 ‘Has the leaving no one behind principle been incorporated in Member States/EU development cooperation policy?’:

- red: leaving no one behind is not mentioned in national strategies and policy documents;
- orange: leaving no one behind is referred to as a guiding principle but no implementation approach is identified OR leaving no one behind is not mentioned but some sectoral policies or efforts are in place
- green: leaving no one behind is translated into national principles, definitions and/or guidelines for implementation.

For question 2 ‘Are Member States/EU institutions using disaggregated data to identify those people left behind?’:

- red: no disaggregating data or no identification of categories for disaggregation;
- orange: disaggregating for some categories but it is unclear whether this information is used to identify those left behind;
- green: using at least some data disaggregation to inform decisions on who is left behind.

For question 3: Are Member States/EU institutions tracking progress on the implementation of leaving no one behind?

- red: no measure of progress nor outcome on leaving no one behind;
- orange: some targets on sectors, groups or countries measure progress against leaving no one behind;
- green: comprehensive approach measuring outcome against leaving no one behind.

8 Idem
9 The CRS DAC line used in this report for tied aid is DAC7b.
11 The CRS DAC line used in this report for repayments of interest on concessional loans and future interest on cancelled debts is DAC2a.
12 Financial Times, OECD is ignoring its definition of overseas aid, 2013, www.ft.com/content/b3d73884-a056-11e2-88b6-00144feabdc0.
13 See: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eur lex/portal/lexdocs/ecas
RESEARCH SOURCES

QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

The main source for the qualitative findings in the report was a review of CONCORD’s position papers, desk-based research drawing on both official and non-official analysis and several interviews with the European Commission, the OECD and CSO representatives. Other sources include the European Commission, OECD and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. This was complemented by inputs from the CONCORD AidWatch team. The main source for the country examples in the report was a standardised questionnaire survey, conducted by the consultants among all of CONCORD’s 28 national platforms, at the start of the report drafting period.

The national platforms themselves drafted the country pages. In the case of the EU institutions, the country page was drafted by the consultant and the main sources used were official European Commission documents, the EU Aid Explorer website and the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

QUANTITATIVE DATA

The report relies on the OECD CRS dataset, including preliminary OECD DAC CRS data for 2018. This data has been complemented by updated figures provided by CONCORD’s national platforms. In some cases, data provided by the European Commission and Eurostat has been used (for example to complement the deflators provided by the OECD, which do not cover all EU28 countries and are applicable mainly against US dollars). Data for 2017 was also compiled using the OECD CRS dataset, now confirmed and which might slightly differ from preliminary data used in last year’s edition.

In 2018, the OECD DAC changed its reporting practice, moving from calculating ODA spending on a cash basis to a grant equivalent basis. In this report, CONCORD analyses recorded ODA against the flow basis method, to facilitate our comparison of ODA figures with previous years.

Except where indicated otherwise, all figures in Part One and given in euros are expressed in ‘2017 constant prices’, as is the case for all the figures obtained from a primary source. The use of constant prices partially justifies the difference of official preliminary figures, in addition to some updated information already included in the report. All figures in Part Two are expressed in current prices.

Since data for 2018 on imputed student costs, tied aid and interest repayments was not published by the OECD or in general not accessible to the national platforms at the time of writing, some projections, based on official data available for 2014 to 2017 have been used to fill these data gaps. The projected data is the average of two functions commonly used to predict future values by using existing ones: linear regression and the Holt-Winters method. This projecting method has proved to be reliable when comparing the result of projecting the figures for 2016 using data for 2012 to 2015 with the figures already published by the OECD for ODA in 2016. Nonetheless, CONCORD AidWatch is cognisant that the conclusions taken from forecasts are mainly indicative of a somehow linear evolution, as the political context may significantly change the outcome.

This same projection method was also used to calculate the estimated timescale for keeping the 0.7% promise, based on both total ODA and genuine ODA.

In addition, the quantitative analysis of ODA provided to LDCs relies on EU compiled data for 2014 to 2017. To ensure consistency across the report, the figures were changed to constant prices. This differs from the OECD DAC, which measures only bilateral input, while this adds also multilateral. This is hence a different approach from the one used in previous AidWatch reports.

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14 The Cypriot National Platform is currently not active.
15 For more information about the EU Aid Explorer see: https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu
17 For more information about the linear regression method see: FORECAST function, https://support.office.com/en-us/article/FORECAST-function-50ca49c9-9-7b40-4592-94e4-7ad586bdea99f
## ANNEX 2 – COUNTRY GROUPS COMPARISON

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<th>Severely off-track countries</th>
<th>Countries being left behind</th>
<th>Severely poverty-challenged countries</th>
<th>Severely financially challenged countries</th>
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*The marker is set to extreme rates of poverty of more than 15% (instead of 20%) to allow for small differences in forecasts.

**CAR: Central African Republic; DPR Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; DRC, Democratic Republic of the Congo
## ANNEX 3 - TABLES

**TABLE 1: EU-15, 2017 AND 2018 GENUINE AND TOTAL ODA AS PERCENTAGE OF GNI (IN 2017 CONSTANT PRICES)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Genuine aid in % GNI in 2018</th>
<th>Total aid in % GNI in 2018</th>
<th>Genuine aid in % GNI in 2017</th>
<th>Total aid in % GNI in 2017</th>
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<td>0.86%</td>
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<td>0.12%</td>
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**TABLE 2: EU-13, 2016 AND 2017 GENUINE AND TOTAL ODA AS PERCENTAGE OF GNI (IN 2017 CONSTANT PRICES)**

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Genuine aid in % GNI in 2018</th>
<th>Total aid in % GNI in 2018</th>
<th>Genuine aid in % GNI in 2017</th>
<th>Total aid in % GNI in 2017</th>
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<td>0.16%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.13%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.11%</td>
</tr>
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<td>EU Member State</td>
<td>Inflated Aid (€m)</td>
<td>% Total Aid</td>
<td>Genuine Aid (€m)</td>
<td>% Total Aid</td>
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<td>-------------------</td>
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TABLE 3 EU 2018 INFLATED AND GENUINE AID (CONST. 2017)
### TABLE 4: EU28 2018 INFLATED AID COMPONENTS

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<th></th>
<th>Total inflated aid</th>
<th>Student costs as % of total inflated aid</th>
<th>Refugee costs as % of total inflated aid</th>
<th>Tied aid as % of total inflated aid</th>
<th>Interest received as % of total inflated aid</th>
<th>Debt relief as % of total inflated aid</th>
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